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Two recent Supreme Court decisions, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, upended the standards of pleading under the Federal Rules.  
In both cases, the plaintiffs had filed complaints so unsubstantiated that the 
Court concluded they could have no other purpose than to abuse the discovery 
process against the defendants.  Rather than subject the defendants to these 
unfair burdens, the Court struck language from a fifty-year-old precedent, 
Conley v. Gibson, that would have allowed the suits to proceed. 
The Court’s solution created three new problems.  Lower court judges 
found little guidance in its new, amorphous “plausibility” standard.  Critics 
argued that Twombly and Iqbal would lock the gates to the federal courts.  
Even the decisions’ supporters bristled at the Court’s cavalier treatment of 
precedent. 
This Comment solves all three of these problems.  It reaches back to the 
writings of David Dudley Field, the great nineteenth-century legal reformer, 
from whose work Judge Charles E. Clark derived the Federal Rules.  
Consulting these two giants of civil procedure reveals Twombly and Iqbal to 
be consistent with the commonsense principles that Field first articulated in 
1847 and Clark reaffirmed in 1938.  For judges interpreting Twombly and 
Iqbal, this Comment fills in those cases’ gaps to propose a model of decision 
that unites traditional principles with the Court’s new jurisprudence.  For the 
critics, this Comment shows how tradition mandates a narrow reading of 
Twombly and Iqbal, allowing judges to dismiss complaints only when those 
complaints present the same dilemma that prompted the Court to intervene.  
For the supporters, this Comment shows how Twombly and Iqbal better reflect 
the original meaning of the Federal Rules than the caselaw the Court 
discarded, so that they no longer need choose between keeping faith with 
tradition and defending sensible pleading standards. 
 
 † This Comment received the 2010 Mary Laura “Chee” Davis Award for Writing Excellence. 
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Into what dangers would you lead me, Cassius, 
That you would have me seek into myself 
For that which is not in me? 
—WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,  
JULIUS CAESAR act 1, sc. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Pleading precedes jurisdiction, and so crisis in pleading threatens crisis for 
all the law.  According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint 
must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 
is entitled to relief.”1  This crisis came about as plaintiffs began to exploit a 
decades-old precedent, which had interpreted this language before the advent 
of modern complex litigation.  Conley v. Gibson,2 articulating a standard that 
would come to be synonymous with the phrase “notice pleading,” instructed 
that a complaint would survive a motion to dismiss3 unless the plaintiff could 
prove “no set of facts” that would entitle him to relief.4  So, said the plaintiffs 
in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, we could sue all the major 
telecommunications companies in America for conspiracy in restraint of trade, 
subjecting them to millions of dollars in discovery costs, without first alleging 
any evidence that such a conspiracy had taken place.5  So, said the plaintiff in 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, I could sue the Attorney General of the United States for 
discrimination, gaining access to sensitive documents about national security 
policy, without first alleging any evidence that he had acted on any racial or 
religious bias.6  If the Court had followed this precedent, all Americans would 
have borne the burdens: as consumers of the telecommunications companies, 
to whom the companies would pass those costs; and as citizens of the 
government, whose leaders would have no choice but to divide their time 
between their duties and their legal defense.  Instead, the Court decided that 
Conley’s no set of facts standard afforded defendants too little protection from 
opportunistic plaintiffs, from whom federal courts would require “plausible” 
claims for relief before allowing their cases to proceed to discovery.7 
 
 1 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 2 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 3 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (allowing defendants to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted”). 
 4 Conley, 355 U.S. at 45. 
 5 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 6 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 7 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. 
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The solution to this crisis created another, because in its rush to do justice 
to the parties before it, the Court seemed to have disregarded the understanding 
of federal pleading as developed over the prior fifty years.  In dissent, Justice 
Stevens excoriated the majority for discarding the bulk of its pleading 
jurisprudence under the Federal Rules.8  Beginning immediately after the 
announcement of the Twombly decision, critics echoed Justice Stevens in 
decrying the majority’s choice to overthrow the “70-year-old regime of notice 
pleading” and its bad faith in doing so.9  The majority’s scanty list of 
authorities supporting its assertion that the no set of facts standard had “been 
questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough”10 played into this 
charge.  The Court’s confusing disposition of the case embarrassed even 
commentators who agreed with its result, such as Professor Richard Epstein, 
who described Twombly motions to dismiss as “(disguised) summary 
judgments.”11  In addition, Twombly replaced the straightforward no set of 
facts standard with a new “plausibility” test so nebulous that in Iqbal, the 
original Twombly majority could not agree on how to apply it to the Iqbal 
complaint.12  This left lower court judges with the task of figuring out how 
Twombly-Iqbal pleading should work in other areas of law. 
If the Conley Court’s 1957 understanding of Federal Rules pleading under 
Rule 8 was correct, then Justice Stevens and the chorus of naysayers have 
Twombly right.  Twombly would exemplify “judicial activism,” the practice of 
judges making up law as it suits them rather than adhering to a consistent 
methodology for deciding cases.  Twombly’s sins would be all the more 
egregious because among the members of that majority are some of the 
harshest critics of judicial law making.13 
This Comment argues that the Federal Rules embody principles dating 
back to David Dudley Field’s original pleading reforms of 1848, which Judge 
Clark updated rather than reinvented when he drafted the Rules on pleading.  It 
 
 8 Id. at 544, 577–78 & n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing numerous authorities). 
 9 See, e.g., Michael Dorf, The End of Notice Pleading?, DORF ON LAW (May 24, 2007, 7:35 AM), 
http://www.michaeldorf.org/2007/05/end-of-notice-pleading.html (describing a “rough consensus coalescing 
among proceduralists” that the Twombly Court’s treatment of precedent is “simply false”). 
 10 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562 (majority opinion). 
 11 Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary 
Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 61–62 (2007). 
 12 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1959 (2009) (Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (Justices Souter and 
Breyer, who were among the Twombly majority, disagreeing with the other five members of the Twombly 
majority on the application of its holding). 
 13 See generally, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (attacking the 
majority’s activism); id. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same). 
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unfolds across three parts.  Part I begins by relating the problems that 
prompted Field’s reforms.  It explains Field’s principles of pleading and how 
the courts of the time misapplied them.  It shows how Judge Clark refined 
Field’s work into Rules pleading only to have Conley misconstrue that as well.  
Part II argues that Twombly and Iqbal mark a return to the original meaning of 
the Rules.  It organizes them into two principles of pleading, which this 
Comment calls the “notice-gap principle” and the “deference principle.”  Part 
III develops these principles of pleading into a model that judges and litigators 
can use to structure their analysis of pleading problems. 
I. COMMENTARIES ON THE CODIFICATION WARS 
Twombly’s roots in the nineteenth-century pleading reform movement both 
explain its textual legitimacy and direct its interpretation for future cases.  The 
pleading reform movement arose because the then-prevailing pleading 
standards wasted litigants’ time and resources on matters unrelated to their 
cases’ merits.  The reformers, led by David Dudley Field, undertook to 
repurpose pleading from a ritual exercise driven by technicalities into a tool to 
focus cases on the real matters in dispute.  Although the problem Field set out 
to solve differs in its particulars from the one that the Twombly Court 
attempted to fix, the same principle of “fair notice” connects these two 
generations of reformers. 
The history of pleading is divided into three parts.  Until the nineteenth 
century, pleading developed as a common law discipline.  As the law had 
evolved, pleading rules persisted from times when courts had entertained fewer 
types of disputes.  These rules had served to restrain courts from exceeding 
their limited jurisdiction, but when changes in the substantive law expanded 
the courts’ role in civic life, the antiquated, obsolete pleading rules remained.14  
David Dudley Field wrote and helped enact a code of civil procedure to restore 
procedural fairness to the litigation process, structuring pleadings around the 
concept of fair notice.  Judges, however, resisted these reforms.  They overlaid 
a doctrine of technicalities onto the process.  These dubious judicial inventions 
came to define the era of “Code pleading.”15  A new generation of reformers 
took on this problem in the twentieth century.  Led by Judge Clark, they chose 
to reassert Field’s principle of fair notice through judicial rules rather than 
statutes.  This ushered in the third era, Federal Rules pleading.  The Rules 
 
 14 See infra Part I.A. 
 15 See infra Part I.B. 
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brought pleading practice closer to Field’s ideal than ever before, but once 
again, judges refused to apply the principle of fair notice as codified, resulting 
in the Conley decision and the muddled caselaw following it.16 
Proper Twombly-Iqbal jurisprudence requires study of this history because 
it provides the answers to questions that fell outside the scope of the Court’s 
review in those cases.  Though on its face Twombly may appear vague and 
incomplete, this is because the decision reaffirms a longstanding doctrine of 
fair notice rather than invents a new one.17  Where the Court’s precedents do 
not provide a certain answer to a Twombly-Iqbal question, judges can use these 
historical sources to discern Rule 8’s original meaning and decide cases 
accordingly. 
A. Pleading at Common Law 
The term “pleading,” though archaic in describing contemporary judges’ 
permissive attitude in granting access to courts, captures the fraught process 
through which litigants attempted to vindicate their claims in the common law 
era by “pleading” for help.  “Pleading” has survived with its tinge of feudal 
supplication intact, recalling that time of limited judicial intervention.  As the 
scope of rights under the substantive law expanded, though, judges did not 
loosen procedural rules to accommodate them.  Instead, they insisted on 
applying those rules woodenly, often inflicting waste and delay on meritorious 
litigants.18 
The common law model of pleading came from a time when courts had 
narrower jurisdiction, structuring cases around the then-crucial determination 
of whether the court had the power to issue judgment for the plaintiff.  Causes 
of action, then known as “forms of action,”19 comprise, in a sense, courts’ 
enumerated powers.20  At common law, plaintiffs invoked these powers 
through “writs,” which corresponded to the available forms of action.21  When 
 
 16 See infra Part I.C. 
 17 See infra Parts I.B, I.C.1, II.A. 
 18 See generally RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.2 (2d ed. 2009) (describing the historical 
development of pleading practice). 
 19 Id. 
 20 Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (limiting the power of the Legislative Branch by individually listing each of 
Congress’s powers).  Just as enumeration of powers checks Congress by confining its legislation to a few key 
subjects, causes of action check the courts by permitting intervention only in a few particular kinds of disputes.  
See id. art. III, § 2 (limiting the power of the Judicial Branch by individually listing the “cases” and 
“controversies” over which the federal courts could exercise jurisdiction). 
 21 FREER, supra note 18, § 7.2. 
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a plaintiff could not articulate his dispute as a form of action, the court had no 
jurisdiction over the parties, and the plea would go unanswered.22  Unlike 
present practice, common law pleading involved successive rounds of pleading 
that continued back and forth until the parties fully developed the questions of 
fact and law for the court.23  Because early legal systems arose as alternatives 
to vengeance, they entertained only controversies involving intentional harms 
that would otherwise have led to feuds.24  Over time, courts began to recognize 
new forms of liability and created new forms of action so that plaintiffs could 
reach them.25 
This jurisdiction-oriented, pleadings-driven style of litigation became 
obsolete when the forms of action began to encroach on one another until no 
jurisdictional gaps remained, because cases were still revolving around 
jurisdiction even as jurisdiction was becoming substantively trivial.  Cases 
arose in which judges might have no doubt about their jurisdiction over a 
dispute or whether the defendant was liable to the plaintiff, but nonetheless 
agonized over whether the plaintiff had sued using the appropriate writ.26  An 
unlucky plaintiff might have found, as his case developed, that the facts 
established his right to relief on some form of action other than his writ’s.  
Though the plaintiff would have won the case had he chosen the correct writ, 
this variance would compel the court to grant judgment to the defendant.27  
The vehemence that this nonsensical practice inspired in its contemporaries has 
persisted to this day.28 
 
 22 See DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, WHAT SHALL BE DONE WITH THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS? (Jan. 1, 
1847), reprinted in 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 226, 
233 (A. P. Sprague ed., 1884) (“In the earliest periods of our law, every cause was commenced by an original 
writ, . . . which gave jurisdiction of the cause to those Courts . . . .”). 
 23 CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 4 (2d ed. 1947) [hereinafter 
CLARK, CODE PLEADING]; FREER, supra note 18, § 7.2. 
 24 O. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 2–3 (1881). 
 25 See id. at 3–38 (tracing the development of liability). 
 26 E.g., Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 294–95 (1850) (distinguishing between the question 
whether “any action will lie,” i.e., whether the plaintiff can obtain any remedy at all, and “the long-vexed 
question, under the rule of the common law, whether a party’s remedy, where he has one, should be sought in 
an action of the case, or of trespass,” i.e., whether the plaintiff sued on the appropriate writ); see also FREER, 
supra note 18, § 7.2 (describing the difference between trespass and case). 
 27 See FIELD, supra note 22, at 237 (“A mistake in the form of the action is generally fatal to the case.”). 
 28 Compare id. at 232 (“Why should it be necessary to go through with this troublesome, dilatory, and 
expensive process, simply to ask one’s adversary a question?”), with FREER, supra note 18, § 7.2 (describing 
common law pleading as “arcane” and “excruciating,” as leading to decisions “based upon technicalities” 
rather than “merits,” as “elevat[ing] form over substance,” and as “hinder[ing] the administration of justice”). 
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B. Pleading Under the Field Code 
The courts did not correct this problem on their own initiative, and so 
lawmakers attempted to impose a solution.  David Dudley Field drafted it, and 
it became known as the “Field Code.”29  Instead of forcing the plaintiff to 
plead “issues,” the Code only tasked the plaintiff with providing notice to the 
defendant of his legal claim and its factual background by pleading “facts.”30  
Field intended this process to replace the common law’s technicalities with a 
flexible notice requirement.  However, judges trained in and used to the 
common law created a new set of technicalities called the “ultimate facts” 
doctrine.  They prohibited not only complaints that provided too little notice to 
the defendant but also those that provided too much.31  The original meaning 
of the Field Code, as understood both by its drafters and by the next generation 
of procedural reformers, never prevailed in practice, leaving its fruition to 
future generations of reformers—ultimately, the Twombly Court. 
The Field Code organized pleadings around the concept of the story of the 
case.  Field wrote, “[T]here can not be any good reason why the story should 
not be told in the ordinary language of life, in the only language intelligible to 
the juries who are to decide the causes.”32  The plaintiff would “set forth his 
cause of action in his complaint briefly, in ordinary language, and without 
repetition.”33  Field envisioned pleadings that would allow “any plain man, 
hearing the parties’ own statements [to] get a better understanding, in half an 
hour, of the points in dispute between them, than the most astute lawyer can 
get from our modern records.”34  His Code reduced pleadings to a complaint 
and answer containing the “real charge” and “real defense,” permitted 
amendment of pleadings for cases in progress, and severed discovery from 
pleading.35 
 
 29 Charles E. Clark, Code Pleading and Practice Today, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD CENTENARY ESSAYS 
55, 56 (Alison Reppy ed., 1949) [hereinafter Clark, Pleading and Practice] (“While the Commission which 
recommended the code was composed of three persons . . . it is well known that the other commissioners 
allowed [Field] free scope to put into effect the original ideas he had been advocating . . . .”). 
 30 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 7 (contrasting Code “fact pleading” against common law 
“issue pleading”). 
 31 FREER, supra note 18, § 7.3.2. 
 32 FIELD, supra note 22, at 239. 
 33 Id. at 240. 
 34 Id. at 244. 
 35 Id. at 240–42. 
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These reforms aimed “to do justice, with the least possible delay and 
expense.”36  As such, this form of pleading also allowed for the practice of 
verification by oath, which Field regarded as “desirable, both as a means of 
preventing to a considerable extent groundless suits and groundless defenses, 
and of compelling the parties respectively to admit the undisputed facts.”37  
“Suppose it were certain that a cause would be better decided if the parties 
were allowed five years to get their proofs, and the Court five years to decide: 
who would think of allowing any such thing?  The expensiveness of lawsuits is 
also a consideration of immense consequence.”38  From this followed his 
insight that “[d]ear justice is no justice to the largest class of litigants.”39 
The Field Code yielded some progress but ultimately disappointed the next 
generation of reformers, who would write the Federal Rules.  The same sort of 
judges whose caprice had provoked the codification movement insisted on 
reading the Field Code obtusely.40  One onlooker, Wisconsin’s then-Chief 
Justice Winslow, marveled at “the cold, not to say inhuman, treatment which 
the infant Code received from the New York judges.”41 
The principal problem in the Code came from language to the effect that 
pleadings should contain “facts” rather than “law” or “evidence,” all terms of 
art in Code pleading.  Judges took the vague distinction between these three 
categories as a license to reintroduce complications into Code pleading.  
Lawyers and judges in practice tended to “overemphasize ‘facts’ as uniquely 
different from either law or evidence.”42  In doing so, these judges perverted 
Field’s fact pleading into a doctrine of “ultimate facts,” as distinguished from 
“conclusions of law” (facts alleged too generally) and “evidentiary facts” (facts 
 
 36 Id. at 243. 
 37 Id. at 239. 
 38 Id. at 247.  A few years later, a British former law clerk denounced 
[a] suit before the Court [of Chancery] which was commenced nearly twenty years ago; in which 
from thirty to forty counsel have been known to appear at one time; in which costs have been 
incurred to the amount of seventy thousand pounds; which is a friendly suit; and which is (I am 
assured) no nearer to its termination now than when it was begun. 
CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 5–6 (Barnes & Noble Classics ed. 2005) (1853). 
 39 FIELD, supra note 22, at 247. 
 40 See FREER, supra note 18, § 7.3.2 (“[M]any of the judges weaned on the technicalities of the common 
law system could not help but import silly subtleties into the new system.”). 
 41 Clark, Pleading and Practice, supra note 29, at 58 (quoting McArthur v. Moffet, 128 N.W. 445, 446 
(Wis. 1910)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 42 Id. 
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alleged too specifically).43  Because “facts do not easily disentangle themselves 
from conclusions or from details,”44 a man of common understanding trying to 
communicate his story in ordinary and concise language could stumble over a 
conclusion of law or evidentiary fact.  This would doom his case.  A layman 
could hardly expect to navigate between this Scylla and Charybdis without the 
assistance of counsel. 
The ultimate facts doctrine eclipsed the fair notice inquiry, which Field 
intended as the real test of a pleading’s adequacy under the Code.  Contrary to 
Field’s ideal of pleadings as “plain, short statement[s] by each party”45 and his 
admonition that under the Code “[w]e shall avoid the risk of losing causes 
from mistaking the rules of pleading,”46 courts discarded complaints that put 
the defendants on notice when those complaints failed to use the courts’ 
preferred formulations of fact.47  Though he criticized complaints that were “so 
general as to convey no idea of the plaintiff’s demand,” he only attacked 
needlessly specific complaints to the extent that they were “redundant with 
words multiplied on words.”48  He placed no totemic significance on the 
pleading of “facts” as such, asking instead for the plaintiff to plead “the nature 
and particulars of the cause of suit,”49 providing further that “[t]he [c]ourt shall 
have power at any time, in its discretion, to amend any . . . pleading . . . in 
furtherance of justice.”50 
For Field, pleadings served only two purposes.  They facilitated trial 
preparation by apprising each party of the other’s case and directing them 
toward the evidence that would settle it, and they facilitated trial itself by 
identifying the issues for the judge and jury to resolve the case.51  These goals 
 
 43 FREER, supra note 18, § 7.3.2.  For example, a plaintiff might try to allege that he has superior title by 
claiming that he “has superior title to the property” or is “entitled to the property,” both of which the New 
York Court of Appeals regarded as impermissibly general.  Id. (quoting Sheridan v. Jackson, 72 N.Y. 170, 173 
(1878)).  Allegations that a plaintiff “paid for property pursuant to contract” and that a defendant “delivered to 
her a deed to the property,” though, were regarded as impermissibly specific by the California Supreme Court.  
Id. (paraphrasing McCaughey v. Shuette, 46 P. 666 (Cal. 1896)). 
 44 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 38. 
 45 FIELD, supra note 22, at 230. 
 46 Id. at 248. 
 47 For some examples of Code courts applying pleading rules arbitrarily, see the sources cited supra note 
43. 
 48 FIELD, supra note 22, at 236; see also CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 38 (“Rarely should a 
pleading be condemned for being overspecific; and then the objection should be considered one of form 
merely—undue verbosity, repetition, etc.—rather than one of substance.”). 
 49 FIELD, supra note 22, at 258. 
 50 Id. at 259. 
 51 Id. at 243–44. 
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animate this Comment’s proposed principles of pleading.52  Judges in Field’s 
time lost sight of these goals, just as the Conley Court would under the Federal 
Rules. 
C. Pleading Under the Federal Rules 
This Comment now arrives at the current era, in which the Federal Rules 
replaced the Field Code at the vanguard of civil procedure, and shows how the 
Conley Court’s misinterpretation of the Rules created the crisis that the Twombly 
and Iqbal Courts would later solve.  This discussion splits into two parts to 
delineate the two major theories of pleading under the Rules.  The first part lays 
out the original meaning of the Federal Rules.  It embraced “fair notice” as the 
pleading model, as Judge Clark explained in his writings.  The second part 
describes how the Conley Court reaffirmed fair notice as a principle of pleading 
but also introduced a new, yet-more-permissive standard of pleading that seemed 
to allow the plaintiff to provide less-than-fair notice. 
1. Fair Notice—Rule 8’s Original Meaning 
Judge Clark, in drafting Rule 8, made Field’s concept of fair notice the 
pleading standard in federal court.  He lifted the Rule’s operative language, “a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief,”53 directly from Field, who had written that a complaint under his Code 
would require “a plain, short statement by each party, of his own case.”54  He 
described Field’s fact pleading as a “main and guiding characteristic[] of 
fundamental importance,”55 and portrayed his own project as a reassertion of 
this “great code principle[] and a reformulation of [it] in the light of modern 
experience to achieve more directly the results which Field had so thoroughly 
visualized.”56 
Clark modernized Field by working with the courts rather than against 
them, switching from a code of pleading imposed on the courts by statute to a 
“code” adopted by the courts as a set of judicial rules.  Clark described his 
project as “chang[ing] the source of our code, not its underlying nature, to 
substitute for the legislature a body which is both more expert in the subject 
 
 52 See infra Part III. 
 53 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 54 FIELD, supra note 22, at 230 (emphasis added). 
 55 Clark, Pleading and Practice, supra note 29, at 57. 
 56 Id. at 58. 
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matter and more responsive to appropriate demands for change.”57  The Rules’ 
relative success vindicates Justice Holmes’s aphorism that “[t]he life of the law 
has not been logic: it has been experience.”58  The experience of the Field 
Code demonstrated that judges could thwart efforts to take control of civil 
procedure from them by interpreting the Code as a broad charter over which 
they were free to develop a new “common law” of pleading.59  The Rules 
solved this problem by conveying ownership of civil procedure back to the 
judges.60  Although the Rules’ language did not deviate from what Field 
suggested in 1847, the Justices of the Supreme Court had little reason to sap 
the Rules by decisional law when they could amend them through a 
straightforward legislative process. 
Compared to Clark’s institutional innovations, the Rules’ drafting changes 
were minor, designed principally to ensure that judges could not import the 
“ultimate facts” caselaw that had bedeviled the Code era into the new Federal 
Rules jurisprudence.  By generically inviting the claimant to show that he “is 
entitled to relief” rather than mandating that he plead “facts,” Clark allowed 
courts to avoid the problem of determining what a “fact” is.61 
According to Clark, the Rules rejected “notice pleading,” opting instead for 
Field’s fair notice standard.  “Notice pleading,” a confusing term because it 
resembles “fair notice,” refers to a practice whereby the plaintiff merely 
informs the defendant of the charge against him without substantiating the 
complaint with any factual background.62  Clark wrote that “[t]he prevailing 
idea at the present time [1947] is that notice should be given of all the 
operative facts going to make up the plaintiff’s cause of action, except, of 
course, those which are presumed or may properly come from the other 
side.”63 
 
 57 Id. 
 58 HOLMES, supra note 24, at 1. 
 59 Cf. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United States Federal 
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 13 (Amy Gutmann ed., 
1997) (“[M]any believe that [the Constitution] is in effect a charter for judges to develop an evolving common 
law . . . .”). 
 60 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006) (granting the Supreme Court final approval of the Rules); cf. Garrett 
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (describing how the institution of property 
encourages conscientious use by the propertied). 
 61 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 38. 
 62 Clark avoided using the term “notice” in the Rules to avert this confusion.  See Charles E. Clark, 
Special Pleading in the “Big Case,” 21 F.R.D. 45, 49–50 (1957) [hereinafter Clark, Special Pleading] 
(“‘[N]otice’ is not a concept of the Rules . . . .”). 
 63 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 38. 
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Clark used the Forms to show the amount of detail Rules pleading required.  
The Forms are “probably the most important part of the rules so far as this 
particular topic [i.e., pleading detail] is concerned, . . . because when you can’t 
define you can at least draw pictures to show your meaning.”64  The old Form 
965 illustrated the difference between notice pleading and the fact pleading 
contemplated by the Federal Rules: 
Even under the simplified federal practice, the form for personal 
injuries sustained in a motor vehicle, Federal Form 9, is not merely a 
claim for money damages for defendant’s “negligence,” but it 
differentiates the accident from all others by showing that it occurred 
between a pedestrian and an autoist at a certain time and place, thus 
making decision as to the proper method of trial or of appeal not 
difficult, and the application of the doctrine of res judicata clear.66 
This quotation illuminates two important aspects of Rule 8.  First, it shows that 
Field’s concept of the claimant telling the story of his case, with just enough 
factual detail to explain the “nature and particulars” of the suit, survived the 
transition from the Code to the Rules.  Second, instead of allowing the plaintiff 
to make a bare allegation of negligence, the Rules represent a policy of 
avoiding “needless delay and expense” by placing some of that burden on the 
plaintiff at pleading.67 
The Rules anticipate a notice requirement that scales as appropriate to the 
particular claim,68 as demonstrated by Forms that require even more specifics.  
Form 17, which provides a model complaint for specific performance of a 
contract, requires the complainant not only to summarize the contents of the 
 
 64 Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYO. L.J. 177, 181 (1958); see also FED. R. 
CIV. P. 84 (“The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that 
these rules contemplate.”). 
 65 The Rules Committee has revised the old Form 9 into a version bereft of local color, FED. R. CIV. P. 
Form 11 (2007), presumably to clarify that the Rules would also apply to an accident a block over on Hall or 
McBride. 
 66 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 38. 
 67 In a manner recalling the common law that the Code and the Rules had displaced, Judge Clark 
recognized that whereas “[g]eneral fact pleading is useful; special pleading of details, carried to the extreme” 
(as in New York’s prior Code practice) would lead to “pleading altercations . . . [that] go on and on as long as 
the judicial patience permits.”  Clark, Special Pleading, supra note 62, at 47, 52.  Judge Clark endorsed a note 
by the Rules Committee explaining that Rule 8(a)(2) “requires the pleader to disclose adequate information as 
the basis of his claim for relief as distinguished from a bare averment that he wants relief and is entitled to it.”  
Id. at 47, 54. 
 68 See CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 38 (explaining that what constitutes a “fact” for the 
purposes of fact pleading depends on the cause of action); infra Part III.A.1. 
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contract but also to attach the contract itself.69  This obligation cannot be 
reconciled with the idea of stating claims in general terms and substantiating 
them only during discovery. 
Other features of the Rules that bear on pleading, including the rules of 
construction, heightened particularity, and certification, reveal Clark’s debt to 
Field.  Rule 1’s requirement that the Rules “be construed and administered to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding”70 tracks Field’s exhortation “to do justice, with the least possible 
delay and expense.”71  Field had designed a certification-by-oath requirement72 
that served as a prototype of Rule 11, which requires pleaders to certify that 
their “factual contentions have evidentiary support or . . . will likely have 
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or 
discovery.”73  Rule 9’s requirement that parties must “state with particularity 
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake” when making such 
allegations,74 which Justice Stevens would later misunderstand as a repudiation 
of fact pleading,75 dates back not merely to the Field Code but to common law 
pleading itself.76 
While on the federal bench, Judge Clark applied the Rules according to the 
principle of fair notice.  The textbook case77 of Dioguardi v. Durning pitted a 
pro se plaintiff against a customs agent, the former alleging (in, as it were, 
ordinary and concise language) that although he had been the high bidder on 
certain “tonics” at auction, the agent had sold them to someone else.78  The 
lower court had erroneously dismissed the case for “fail[ure] to state facts 
sufficient to constitute a cause of action” but did not explain why it believed 
the plaintiff had not stated a claim.79  Judge Clark explained that the complaint, 
which had laid out the date, place, and harm giving rise to the suit, sufficed to 
 
 69 FED. R. CIV. P. Form 17 (2007). 
 70 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 71 Field, supra note 22, at 243. 
 72 See id. at 243 (verifying pleadings by affidavit). 
 73 FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 74 Id. at 9(b). 
 75 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 584 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (interpreting 
Rule 9(b) to preclude using pleading to curb discovery abuse). 
 76 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 39. 
 77 See, e.g., RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
QUESTIONS 293–98 (5th ed. 2008). 
 78 139 F.2d 774, 774–75 (2d Cir. 1944). 
 79 Id. 
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state a claim under the relevant public auction statute.80  This result followed 
the principle that as long as the plaintiff provides fair notice to the defendant, 
the court should not dismiss a claim for failure to observe some technical 
pleading formula. 
2. No Set of Facts—“A Phrase Best Forgotten as an Incomplete, Negative 
Gloss on an Accepted Pleading Standard”81 
Though both the text of the Rules, which comes from Field’s exegesis on 
fact pleading, and Clark’s subsequent commentary affirm the fair notice model 
of pleading, the Court declined to apply Rule 8 faithfully in its pleading 
jurisprudence.  Although Conley v. Gibson seemed to reaffirm Rule 8’s fair 
notice requirement,82 it also provided a new “notice pleading” standard: a case 
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless “no set of facts” 
could entitle the claimant to relief.83  This permissive standard contradicted the 
principle of fair notice.  It seemed to prohibit courts from dismissing 
complaints that offered inadequate notice if the plaintiff could possibly prove a 
set of facts that would entitle him to relief.  The Court did not acknowledge 
this problem.  As a result, two separate lines of jurisprudence emerged from 
Conley.  Some later cases cited Conley for the proposition that the Rules 
required fair notice, the most prominent of these being Twombly itself.84  Other 
cases cited Conley for its “no set of facts” language, and Justice Stevens would 
have resolved Twombly according to that standard.85  This subsection of the 
Comment will show that Conley was divided against itself. 
The urgency of civil rights and the staid pace of civil procedure pulled 
Conley apart.  The Conley Court addressed the question of whether the 
complaint, which alleged a union’s racial discrimination, stated a claim under 
federal civil rights law.86  Justice Black, writing for the majority, summarized 
the allegations as follows: 
Petitioners were employees of the Texas and New Orleans Railroad 
at its Houston Freight House.  Local 28 of the Brotherhood was the 
designated bargaining agent under the Railway Labor Act for the 
 
 80 Id. at 775. 
 81 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007). 
 82 355 U.S. 41, 45, 47 (1957). 
 83 Id. at 45. 
 84 E.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563; Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005). 
 85 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 577–78 & n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing numerous authorities). 
 86 Conley, 355 U.S. at 44. 
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bargaining unit to which petitioners belonged.  A contract existed 
between the Union and the Railroad which gave the employees in the 
bargaining unit certain protection from discharge and loss of 
seniority.  In May 1954, the Railroad purported to abolish 45 jobs 
held by petitioners or other Negroes all of whom were either 
discharged or demoted.  In truth the 45 jobs were not abolished at all 
but instead filled by whites as the Negroes were ousted, except for a 
few instances where Negroes were rehired to fill their old jobs but 
with loss of seniority.  Despite repeated pleas by petitioners, the 
Union, acting according to plan, did nothing to protect them against 
these discriminatory discharges and refused to give them protection 
comparable to that given white employees.87 
Justice Black noted that “[i]f these allegations are proven there has been a 
manifest breach of the Union’s statutory duty to represent fairly and without 
hostile discrimination all of the employees in the bargaining unit,”88 which is 
to say that the plaintiffs had succeeded in laying out the story of their case.  
Responding to the defendants’ argument that the Rules required more factual 
specificity from the complaint, Justice Black explained that complaints suffice 
when they “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and 
the grounds upon which it rests” and cited the Forms as “plainly 
demonstrat[ing] this.”89 
That aspect of the case correctly applied Field’s and Judge Clark’s 
principles as enacted in the Federal Rules, but the remainder of the decision 
both misapplied the Rules and contradicted the foregoing dicta.  The 
centerpiece of the Court’s error was its assertion that “a complaint should not 
be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the 
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle 
him to relief.”90  Among its authorities for declaring this “the accepted rule” 
was, surprisingly, Judge Clark’s opinion in Dioguardi v. Durning, which held 
no such thing.91 
 
 87 Id. at 43.  Justice Black’s summary goes on to include some allegations that the Twombly Court would 
likely have considered conclusory.  See infra Part III.A.1. 
 88 Conley, 355 U.S. at 46. 
 89 Id. at 47. 
 90 Id. at 45–46. 
 91 See Clark, Special Pleading, supra note 62, at 53–54.  In a note excerpted by Judge Clark, the Rules 
Committee explained that Dioguardi “was not based on any holding that a pleader is not required to supply 
information disclosing a ground for relief.  The complaint in that case stated a plethora of facts and the court so 
construed them as to sustain the validity of the pleading.”  Id. 
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This no set of facts standard fit neither the text of the Rules nor the 
principles that underlie them.  Rule 8 requires the plaintiff to “show,” not 
merely assert, that he “is entitled to relief,”92 by relating in the complaint the 
story of his case.93  A plaintiff could fail to provide fair notice of what the 
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests and yet satisfy this standard94—in 
an extreme case by pleading, “The defendant is liable to me.”  This standard 
also would permit pleadings that violate Rule 11’s requirement that in the 
plaintiff’s representations to the court, his “factual contentions . . . will likely 
have evidentiary support,”95 a degree of confidence stricter than the Conley 
Court’s “beyond doubt” formulation.  Though these two Rules lack any 
explicit connection, reading them in conjunction would result in an anomaly.  
It would allow pleadings whose contentions are merely not beyond doubt but 
require lawyers to certify that those same contentions are likely to find 
evidentiary support.  The breadth of the no set of facts standard strips from the 
trial judge the discretion to administer Rule 8 justly, speedily, and 
inexpensively in accordance with the historical meaning of Rule 1.96  A system 
of pleading can satisfy Rule 1 “only as it tends to . . . enabl[e] the parties the 
better to prepare for trial” or “assist[] the jury and the Court in judging the 
cause.”97  Rule 84 states that the Forms “illustrate the simplicity and brevity 
that these rules contemplate.”98  Yet, as Judge Clark had explained,99 they too 
require more factual detail than notice pleading under no set of facts. 
The remainder of this Comment assumes that the no set of facts standard 
constitutes Conley’s holding.  A narrow reading of this case would regard the 
“fair notice” language as the holding: this stricter test would have reached the 
same result because the Conley complaint contained the full story of the 
plaintiff’s case.  However, cases all the way through Justice Stevens’s dissent 
in Twombly have cited “no set of facts” as the Conley holding.100  Regardless 
 
 92 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 93 See supra Part I.B. 
 94 See Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting conflict between 
“no set of facts” and “grounds upon which it rests” language). 
 95 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). 
 96 Id. at 1. 
 97 FIELD, supra note 22, at 243 (“The legitimate end of every administration of law is to do justice, with 
the least possible delay and expense.  Every system of pleading is useful only as it tends to this end.  This it 
can do but in one of two ways: either by enabling the parties the better to prepare for trial, or by assisting the 
jury and the Court in judging the cause.”); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules should be construed and 
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”). 
 98 FED. R. CIV. P. 84. 
 99 See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text. 
 100 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 38. 
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of what Justice Black might have meant by that phrase in 1957, by the time 
Twombly came down fifty years later “no set of facts” had come to signify a 
fully articulated pleading doctrine.  It remains the most plausible alternative to 
the fair notice standard that Field created, that Twombly reaffirmed, and that 
this Comment advocates. 
II. THE RESTORATION OF FAIR NOTICE 
In revisiting Conley v. Gibson to resolve the tension between the fair notice 
cases and the no set of facts cases, this Comment argues that the Court decided 
Twombly correctly because it chose to restore fair notice as the pleading 
standard rather than articulate a new, third way.  As a jurisprudential matter, 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly could legitimately overrule Conley’s precedent 
only if the Court could claim that its standard better reflects the original 
meaning of Rule 8 than Conley did, because otherwise the doctrine of stare 
decisis would militate against unsettling the law.101  The question whether 
Twombly, along with Ashcroft v. Iqbal, faithfully captured the history runs 
deeper than merely passing judgment on that case because, as this Comment 
argues,102 the Twombly-Iqbal standard’s historical roots can guide judges 
through a consistent and fair analytical method where the Court’s binding 
authority does not provide a clear rule of decision. 
This Comment has shown that the two major historical goals of pleading 
reform were advancing the parties’ interest in procedural fairness and the 
systemic interest in resolving cases on the merits.103  This Part argues that 
Twombly and Iqbal share these same two goals.  The Twombly Court stated 
that it considers fair notice to be Conley’s actual holding.104  It rejected the idea 
that the no set of facts standard has served, or could serve, as a pleading 
standard when taken literally.105  Both Twombly and Iqbal discuss a 
“plausibility” standard,106 i.e., that courts should dismiss for failure to state a 
“plausible claim.”  Although it may seem to be an improvisation of the 
 
 101 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 577–78 & n.4 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(citing numerous authorities employing no set of facts as the established standard). 
 102 See infra Part III. 
 103 See supra Part I. 
 104 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–63 (majority opinion) (focusing on the “fair notice of what 
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” requirement as the Conley holding (quoting Conley v. 
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
 105 Id. at 562. 
 106 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564. 
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Twombly Court, plausibility represents not so much a new standard as a gloss 
on fair notice. 
The Court’s concept of plausibility encompasses both of the fair notice 
reforms, and this Comment shows how to break the Court’s plausibility 
analysis into these components.  Part II.A reveals how the Twombly and Iqbal 
Courts’ analysis of the respective complaints’ notice comports with the “story 
of the case” theory of notice107 as understood by David Dudley Field and Judge 
Clark.  The Court probed each story for holes in the notice that it provided to 
determine whether it stated a claim, a process that this Comment terms “notice-
gap analysis.”  Part II.B demonstrates that the policy driving the Twombly 
Court’s decision follows David Dudley Field’s principle that “[d]ear justice is 
no justice,”108 prohibiting a structure of litigation in which manifest unfairness 
to defendants would preclude the resolution of cases on their merits.  Although 
the Court did not explicitly incorporate this principle into its test, neither did 
the Court exclude it,109 and its thorough policy discussion suggests that lower 
courts should consider this principle when applying Twombly-Iqbal to other 
areas of law.  This Comment structures the Court’s policy analysis as follows: 
where a complaint has a notice gap and the defendant would, as a result of that 
gap, suffer an unfair burden from proceeding to discovery, the judge should 
defer to the defendant’s interest in procedural fairness by dismissing the case.  
This Comment refers to this as the “deference principle.” 
A. Plausible Notice as Story of the Case 
This section of the Comment shows how the Court’s “plausibility” analysis 
in Twombly and Iqbal does not illegitimately depart from pleading traditions 
but rather restores the traditional fair notice inquiry to its proper place in 
pleading jurisprudence.  Working through the Twombly opinion, the Twombly 
Court reconstructed from the complaint the story about the defendants’ alleged 
wrong and identified the gaps in the notice it provided.  Although the Court 
characterized the problem in terms of the complaint not plausibly giving rise to 
the inference that the defendant was liable,110 the Court’s treatment of the issue 
implies that, but for the notice gaps, the complaint would have stated a 
claim.111  In the Iqbal opinion, the Court stated outright that the complaint 
 
 107 See supra Part I.B. 
 108 FIELD, supra note 22, at 247. 
 109 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544. 
 110 Id. at 566. 
 111 Id. at 569 n.14. 
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would have survived the motion to dismiss if the complaint had contained 
certain crucial facts.112  In each case, plausibility does not add anything to the 
fair notice analysis, and the Court could have reached the same result even if it 
had omitted the plausibility language. 
1. Story of the Case in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 
The beginning of this Comment described Twombly-Iqbal as the solution to 
a crisis in the law, and a review of Twombly’s facts demonstrates the 
importance not only of resolving the individual case but also of repairing a 
broken pleading rule that invited large-scale discovery abuse.  The defendants 
in Twombly comprised a group of large telecommunications firms, whose 
customer base includes virtually all Americans.113  In an attempt to encourage 
competition in the industry, Congress enacted a statute to force local carriers to 
license their local communications infrastructure to their competitors.114  The 
defendants chose not to take advantage of this option, electing instead to avoid 
the competition that would result if their competitors reciprocated, a business 
practice known as “conscious parallelism.”115  As long as each defendant did 
so unilaterally, the defendants’ actions collectively would not constitute a 
“conspiracy in restraint of trade” in violation of antitrust law.116  The complaint 
alleged, however, that the defendants had engaged in such a conspiracy.117  
The plaintiffs contemplated a class action of all subscribers to telephone or 
internet service.118  A similar group of present and future subscribers would 
bear the costs of litigating it.  This group is so extensive that the discovery 
burdens would constitute a de facto tax collected by a private IRS. 
 
 112 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009). 
 113 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (“[P]laintiffs represent a putative class of at least 90 percent of all 
subscribers to local telephone or high-speed Internet service in the continental United States . . . .”). 
 114 Id. at 549. 
 115 Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540–41 (1954). 
 116 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 552, 564 (“[A]llegations of parallel business conduct, taken alone, do not 
state a claim under” the relevant antitrust statute.).  But see Clark, Special Pleading, supra note 65, at 52 
(conscious parallelism alone can give rise to an inference of conspiracy).  There are two reasons why the latter 
should not be troubling.  First, inasmuch as the Twombly Court read Theater Enterprises’s plus factors 
differently from Clark—as substantive elements of a conspiracy claim—they would require at least some 
independent factual support.  Second, as this Comment explains in more detail in Part III.A.2, whether to draw 
an inference of this sort in a particular case will depend on whether the circumstances present (as here) a 
“strong countervailing inference” against the plaintiff’s allegations. 
 117 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550. 
 118 Id. at 559. 
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Much of the confusion about Twombly arises from the Court’s poor 
explanation of the plausibility standard it used to determine the sufficiency of 
notice.  Justice Souter opened by quoting the “fair notice” line from Conley, 
which he then defined as “plausible grounds to infer” the wrong alleged.119  He 
explained that a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” but 
mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of the 
cause of action” does not suffice.120  He further stated that a complaint requires 
“enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made”: 
not so much fact as to meet a “probability requirement” but enough “to raise a 
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal 
agreement.”121  This hodgepodge of vague categories provided little guidance 
about how to settle close questions. 
The Court instead began to reveal its method in rejecting Conley’s “no set 
of facts” language.  Justice Souter described the no set of facts standard “as an 
incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has 
been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts 
consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”122  He understood Conley as a 
case whose complaint would have survived the fair notice standard,123 such 
that the “no set of facts” language misleads the reader about what the Conley 
Court did.124  Justice Souter regarded the Conley Court as having “described 
the breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint claims, not the 
minimum standard of adequate pleading to govern a complaint’s survival.”125  
The merits of this understanding aside, Justice Souter here seemed to consider 
the term “set of facts” as analogous to Field’s story of the case.  Further, he 
quoted approvingly language from circuit decisions that “a complaint . . . must 
contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material 
elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory”126 and 
 
 119 Id. at 555–56. 
 120 Id. at 555. 
 121 Id. at 556. 
 122 Id. at 563. 
 123 See supra Part I.C.2. 
 124 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562–63 (“[N]o set of facts” language “should be understood in light of the 
opinion’s preceding summary of the complaint’s concrete allegations, which the Court quite reasonably 
understood as amply stating a claim for relief.”). 
 125 Id. at 563. 
 126 Id. at 562 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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that “we do not think that Conley imposes a duty on the courts to conjure up 
unpleaded facts.”127 
The Court then provided two examples of its notice analysis, each of which 
follows the notice gap model.  Had the complaint alleged agreement directly, 
said Justice Souter, “we doubt that the complaint’s references to an agreement 
among the [defendants] would have given the notice required by Rule 8.”128  
The complaint “mentioned no specific time, place, or person involved in the 
alleged conspiracies. . . .  furnish[ing] no clue as to which of the four 
[defendants] (much less which of their employees) supposedly agreed, or when 
and where the illicit agreement took place.”129  Souter contrasted these notice 
gaps with old Form 9’s model complaint, which he considered as a model for 
the complete factual picture that the Rules contemplate.130 
To judge the plaintiffs’ attempt at indirect proof, the Court also attempted 
to put together a story of their case that complied with Rule 8.  The relevant 
substantive law requires a plaintiff attempting to prove conspiracy indirectly to 
show not only conscious parallelism but also “plus factors,” particular kinds of 
circumstantial evidence that more strongly suggest a conspiracy.131  Justice 
Souter used this structure—parallelism, then plus factors—to model his 
pleading analysis,132 presumably on the theory that the plaintiffs would not be 
“entitled to relief” unless they could later prove one of those plus factors.  The 
factual material in the complaint tended to establish only parallel conduct: the 
complaint described each defendant engaging in various business practices 
resisting competition, which served each individual defendant’s interests 
without requiring collusion.133 
The notice gap here consisted of the plus factors’ absence.  When Souter 
asked whether anything in the complaint “invest[ed] either the action or 
inaction alleged with a plausible suggestion of conspiracy,”134 he meant that if 
he could characterize any of the allegations as suggesting more than mere 
 
 127 Id. (quoting O’Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 n.3 (1st Cir. 1976)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 128 Id. at 565 n.10. 
 129 Id. 
 130 See id. (contrasting old Form 9 with allegations in the Twombly complaint that gave the defendants “no 
clue” how to respond). 
 131 Id. at 552–53. 
 132 See id. at 557 (“An allegation of parallel conduct . . . gets the complaint close to stating a claim, but 
without some further factual enhancement it stops short” of sufficiency.). 
 133 Id. at 566. 
 134 Id. 
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parallel conduct, such an allegation could fill in the complaint’s notice gap.  He 
analyzed each allegation that approached a plus factor, but determined that 
none of them did more than redundantly describe various courses of the 
defendants’ parallel conduct.135  In other words, with the information at their 
disposal, the plaintiffs could accuse the defendants only of activities that would 
not, in and of themselves, incur liability.136  The notice gap here meant that the 
complaint did not, in the ordinary sense, state a claim: instead of using 
discovery to flesh out a dispute that existed prior to the outset of litigation, the 
plaintiffs hoped to use discovery to create a new dispute and extract from the 
defendants its settlement value.137 
Over the course of its notice analysis, the Court took care to distinguish the 
allegations that provided notice from those that merely explained the legal 
consequences of those allegations.  Justice Souter described the former as 
“[f]actual allegations” and the latter as “conclusory allegations,”138 raising the 
specter of the “ultimate facts” doctrine and its phony distinctions between 
“legal conclusions,” “ultimate facts,” and “evidentiary facts.”139  Recall the 
lesson Judge Clark drew from the ultimate facts debacle: judges should gauge 
allegations’ merit not on the basis of formalistic criteria but on whether those 
allegations offer the defendant any actual notice.140  Despite his terms’ 
unfortunate resemblance, Justice Souter avoided those mistakes.  The 
allegations that he deemed “conclusory” afforded the defendants no notice of 
how the plaintiffs believed the defendants harmed them, but instead only 
described the legal effect of the unpleaded conduct that they hoped to unearth 
during discovery, supposing that defendants had in fact engaged in such 
wrongful conduct.141  Because such allegations only inform the reader of the 
inferences the complainant hopes to elicit, providing no notice about the 
dispute itself, Justice Souter appropriately disregarded them in his notice-gap 
analysis. 
 
 135 Id. at 566–69. 
 136 This constitutes a Rule 11 violation.  See infra Parts III.A.1, III.B.2. 
 137 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (noting that the prospect of discovery abuse increases the settlement 
value of the case). 
 138 Id. at 555, 557. 
 139 See supra Part I.B. 
 140 See supra Part I.C.1. 
 141 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10. 
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Justice Stevens dissented, his substantive argument142 amounting to the 
proposition that courts should ignore notice gaps to facilitate the plaintiffs’ 
bar’s role as private antitrust regulators.  Quoting Adam Smith, Justice Stevens 
claimed that “[p]eople of the same trade seldom meet together, even for 
merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the 
public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.”143  The majority observed that, 
according to Justice Stevens’s inference, meeting together for merriment and 
diversion would force the tradesman to “devote financial and human capital to 
hire lawyers, prepare for depositions, and otherwise fend off allegations of 
conspiracy . . . .”144  Although in some cases Justice Stevens’s standard might 
uncover conspiracies against the public that would otherwise have remained 
hidden, it would also allow private parties to infringe on tradesmen’s right to 
partake in merriment and diversion, by attaching discovery costs to it.  The 
majority worried that plaintiffs would use the broader investigatory powers 
that Justice Stevens envisioned as a license to engage in profiteering.145  This 
would undercut whatever civic good might come from increasingly vigorous 
private antitrust enforcement. 
Twombly, then, is not an example of a hard case making bad law so much 
as an easy case making vague law.  The no set of facts standard demanded the 
Court indulge the Twombly plaintiffs in, at best, tilting at windmills.  The 
complaint was insufficient to such an extreme that the Court need not have 
articulated a precise pleading standard to dispose of the case.  In what 
retrospectively seems a misguided exercise of minimalism, it chose to leave 
that standard for a future, subtler case.  Further, Twombly demonstrates the 
enduring value of Field’s draftsmanship.  Even though the Court apparently 
 
 142 Justice Stevens’s dissent also contained a historical argument about “notice pleading” under the Rules.  
Id. at 573–76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  See supra Parts I.B and I.C.1 for a discussion of this history.  The 
sources Justice Stevens cited in support of the proposition that the original meaning of Rule 8(a)(2) (as 
distinguished from the later caselaw misinterpreting it) established a system of notice pleading actually 
maintained the opposite.  Compare Twombly, 550 U.S. at 587–88 & n.8 (citing Clark, Special Pleading, supra 
note 62, at 46) (chastising the majority’s deviation from “notice pleading”), with Clark, Special Pleading, 
supra note 62, at 50 (chastising a lower court judge for describing the Rules as a system of notice pleading); 
compare also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 576 (using old Form 9 as an example of Rule 8 requiring only “general 
notice-giving”), with CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 38 (using old Form 9 as an example of Rule 8 
requiring fact pleading rather than mere notice-giving). 
 143 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 591 (quoting ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 54 (1852)) (alteration in original). 
 144 Id. at 567 n.12 (majority opinion). 
 145 See id. at 558–59 (explaining the potential for abuse inherent in the expensive antitrust discovery 
process). 
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ignored the historical record, it nonetheless interpreted the “short and plain” 
language much as Field had intended.146 
2. Notice-Gap Analysis in Ashcroft v. Iqbal 
Like Twombly, Ashcroft v. Iqbal presented a crisis whose improper 
resolution would have severe consequences for the public interest, but this time 
the plaintiffs threatened public officialdom rather than private commerce.  The 
plaintiffs alleged that federal officials had violated their civil rights by 
rounding them up after the September 11th terrorist attacks on the basis of their 
race rather than on genuine suspicion of wrongdoing.147  Rather than bring suit 
only against the officials immediately responsible for the alleged harm, the 
complaint attempted to go all the way to the top, as it were, and charged the 
then-Attorney General with masterminding a scheme of illegal 
discrimination.148  Civil rights jurisprudence contains an affirmative defense of 
qualified immunity that functions like the plus factors in antitrust.  The 
plaintiff must provide a particular sort of circumstantial evidence—specific 
intent to discriminate—to establish liability at trial.149  Like its counterpart in 
Twombly, the Iqbal complaint sought to rely on inferences from facts arguably 
consistent with either permissible conduct, by crafting a policy that 
incidentally affected one race more than others, or impermissible 
discrimination, by using the public-policy rationale as a pretext to injure a 
disfavored race.150  This litigation presented a systemic problem of exposing 
high officials to the burdens of defending suits brought on the basis of their 
subordinates’ wrongdoing, even against plaintiffs who could not articulate any 
connection between the harm and the defendant-official beyond an attenuated 
supervisory relationship.151 
The Iqbal Court refined the vague notice standard from Twombly into an 
analysis that more straightforwardly applies the traditional story-of-the-case 
understanding of pleading.  Justice Kennedy began “by taking note of the 
elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim of unconstitutional 
discrimination against officials entitled to assert the defense of qualified 
 
 146 See supra Part I.B. 
 147 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1944 (2009). 
 148 Id. at 1942. 
 149 Id. at 1947–49. 
 150 Id. at 1949. 
 151 Id. at 1953–54. 
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immunity.”152  This reaffirmed Field’s principle that the complaint should 
frame the case by pleading to all the points in dispute.153  He then organized 
the Twombly notice analysis into two prongs: first, separate the “factual” 
allegations, which provide notice, from the “conclusory” allegations, which do 
not; and second, add up the factual allegations to determine whether they 
“plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”154  In a manner recalling Judge 
Clark’s principle that what constitutes notice depends on the circumstances of 
the case,155 Kennedy described the inquiry as a “task that requires the 
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”156 
In separating the factual from the conclusory allegations, Justice Kennedy 
examined each allegation with an eye toward its eventual place in the story of 
the plaintiff’s case.  The allegations that “the [FBI], under the direction of [one 
of the defendants], arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men . . . as 
part of its investigation of the events of September 11” and “[t]he policy of 
holding post-September-11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of 
confinement until they were ‘cleared’ by the FBI was approved by [the 
defendants] in discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001,” each 
provided notice to the defendant about how the plaintiff intended to prove 
those elements of his case.157  Both of them would have guided the discovery 
process toward particular facts to prove or disprove. 
The complaint did not state a claim, however, because it lacked the final, 
crucial piece of the story.  The claims “rest[ed] solely on their ostensible 
‘policy of holding post-September-11th detainees’ . . . once they were 
categorized as ‘of high interest.’”158  To finish this story, the plaintiff needed to 
show “that petitioners purposefully adopted a policy of classifying post-
September-11 detainees as ‘of high interest’ because of their race, religion, or 
national origin.”159  None of the allegations in the complaint provided notice of 
what facts had led the plaintiff to believe that the defendants had acted with a 
discriminatory state of mind.160 
 
 152 Id. at 1947. 
 153 See supra Part I.B. 
 154 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. 
 155 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 38. 
 156 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. 
 157 Id. at 1951 (third alteration in original). 
 158 Id. at 1952. 
 159 Id. 
 160 If the plaintiff had no objective reason to believe this, then these pleadings violated Rule 11.  See infra 
Parts III.A.1, III.B.2. 
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The dissent, written by Twombly’s author, Justice Souter, contested 
Kennedy’s treatment of certain conclusory statements.  Justice Souter 
contended that the Court had “no principled basis” for disregarding allegations 
attributing an improper motive to the defendants.161  The statements he would 
have credited alleged that “after September 11, the FBI designated Arab 
Muslim detainees as being of ‘high interest’ ‘because of the race, religion, and 
national origin of the detainees, and not because of any evidence of the 
detainees’ involvement in supporting terrorist activity,’” and that the 
defendants “‘knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed’ to that 
discrimination.”162 
The principled basis distinguishing what the majority regarded as factual 
from what it regarded as conclusory comes from the traditional understanding 
of fair notice.  The statements that the majority and the dissent agreed are 
factual explain what the plaintiff would endeavor to prove.  For example, the 
allegation about the defendants crafting a detainment policy “in discussions in 
the weeks after September 11, 2001,”163 though not very specific, puts the 
defendants in a position to admit or contest a fact.  The defendants can answer 
this allegation by contesting or conceding whether the “discussions” actually 
took place.  The two statements Justice Souter disputed merely claimed that the 
defendants had a particular state of mind without providing any supporting 
facts.164  The defendants presumably knew whether they committed the alleged 
discrimination, but these statements did not inform them of the facts that led 
the plaintiff to infer the defendants’ wrongful intent.  Discovery and judgment, 
though, would focus not on the defendants’ actual mental state but on facts that 
would resolve the issue under an external standard.165 
The comparison between these statements demonstrates the connection 
between the duty to provide notice and the right to undertake discovery.  The 
nonconclusory statements, though broad, defined the scope of potential 
discovery by identifying facts for discovery to confirm or refute.  The 
conclusory statements anticipated an open-ended discovery, wherein the 
plaintiff could have conducted any inquiry that might uncover a fact relevant to 
 
 161 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1961 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. at 1944 (majority opinion). 
 164 See id. at 1952 (“[R]espondent’s complaint does not contain any factual allegation sufficient to 
plausibly suggest petitioners’ discriminatory state of mind.”). 
 165 See generally HOLMES, supra note 24, at 130–63 (describing how, although intentional torts often 
feature apparently moral elements such as “malice,” the law adjudicates them based on objective standards 
susceptible to factual inquiry rather than subjective standards that examine the defendant’s psychology). 
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the defendants’ mental state.  Any confirmation of these conclusory statements 
could only come about indirectly.  That is, if the allegations about the 
defendants’ mental states are accurate, then some directly confirmable fact 
must exist from which a court could infer the defendants’ wrongful intent.  
Presumably, the plaintiff chose a formulation that the majority understood as 
“conclusory” because he could not allege any particular facts to illustrate the 
defendants’ intent.  Instead, he was merely guessing that it was true without 
any objective basis for a good-faith allegation—a violation of Rule 11.166  
Without providing such facts, the plaintiff did not fulfill his duty to provide 
notice, which would have entitled him to discovery. 
B. The Court’s Policy Rationale as Deference Principle 
The question of whether the complaint has a notice gap does not fully 
dispose of the issue.  In both Twombly and Iqbal, the Court detailed the 
consequences, both for the particular defendants and for the system as a whole, 
of wrongly allowing each of those cases to proceed to discovery despite the 
notice gaps in their respective complaints.167  In neither case did the holding 
depend on the policy rationale.  The Court described its methodology strictly in 
terms of plausible notice.168  Nonetheless, the Court chose to discuss the 
importance of its reaching the correct result in each case, even at the risk of 
inviting charges of bad faith.  Cynics might assume that the ostensible holding 
operated as a pretext for a political agenda that in fact decided the cases. 
This Comment argues that the Court’s reasoning about policy should 
control in cases where the complaint has notice gaps that do not impose the 
kind of unfair burdens that the Court described in Twombly and Iqbal.  A 
reading of these cases as requiring dismissal of all complaints that contain 
notice gaps is also consistent with those cases’ holdings.  However, such a 
reading would render the Court’s policy arguments redundant and rest the case 
less easily on the traditions of pleading.  At the core of both David Dudley 
Field’s pleading reforms and Judge Clark’s updates to them was an overriding 
 
 166 See infra Parts III.A.1, III.B.2. 
 167 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954 (“[W]e are impelled to give real content to the concept of qualified 
immunity for high-level officials who must be neither deterred nor detracted from the vigorous performance of 
their duties.”); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (“[O]nly by taking care to require 
allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy [can we] hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense 
of discovery . . . .”). 
 168 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954 (“Because respondent’s complaint is deficient under Rule 8, he is not 
entitled to discovery . . . .”); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (“Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their 
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.”). 
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mandate to resolve cases on the merits rather than on technicalities.169  The 
notice-gap inquiry itself affords some flexibility to infer facts that are 
“presumed or may properly come from the other side.”170  Supplementing this 
with a principle of fairness to moderate notice-gap dismissal would better 
situate Twombly-Iqbal jurisprudence in the Rules, the first of which demands a 
construction that secures not only the “speedy” and “inexpensive” 
determination of cases but also the “just.”171 
This Comment derives from the two policy arguments in Twombly and 
Iqbal a broader principle of deference to defendants in all cases where 
complaints deficient in notice would impose unfair burdens on them.  In 
Twombly, the Court inferred that the open-ended, expensive discovery process, 
coupled with the high degree of uncertainty that the discovery would reveal 
anything relevant to the case, would likely preclude a resolution of the case on 
the merits.172  Instead, the Court expected the suit to settle for its nuisance 
value, which would have inflicted an unfair burden on the defendant.173  In 
Iqbal, similar notice gaps would have allowed the plaintiff, but for the Court’s 
intervention, to make an end run around qualified immunity and harass a top 
official over what was essentially a political rather than a legal dispute.174  
Punishing an official for pursuing a controversial but not illegal policy, by 
exposing him to the burdens of defense and discovery, would both unduly 
harm him and compromise his ability to serve the public interest.175 
1. Protection of Private Interests in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 
Once the Court had established that the complaint in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly did not tell the full story of the claim against the defendants, it 
considered the likely harms that the defendants, as well as other defendants in 
similar cases, would suffer from allowing such deficient complaints to proceed 
to discovery.  Deficient complaints present jurisdictional problems.  They ask 
courts not to command discovery to prepare disputes already in existence for 
trial, but rather to attempt to develop inchoate disputes to maturity.  This 
indulgence can allow “a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim . . . to take up 
 
 169 See supra Parts I.B, I.C.1. 
 170 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 38; see also supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 171 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 172 See supra Part II.A.1; infra Part II.B.1. 
 173 See supra Part II.A.1; infra Part II.B.1. 
 174 See infra Part II.B.2. 
 175 See infra Part II.B.2. 
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the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing an in 
terrorem increment of the settlement value.”176 
The scope and expense of Twombly’s prospective discovery impressed 
upon the Court the importance of preventing abuse.  Justice Souter described 
the scale of the likely costs as “obvious enough”: 
[P]laintiffs represent a putative class of at least 90 percent of all 
subscribers to local telephone or high-speed Internet service in the 
continental United States, in an action against America’s largest 
telecommunications firms (with many thousands of employees 
generating reams and gigabytes of business records) for unspecified 
(if any) instances of antitrust violations that allegedly occurred over a 
period of seven years.177 
The prospect of systemic problems, which would arise from a rule allowing 
plaintiffs to proceed against defendants in like cases, counsels against a 
permissive attitude toward deficient complaints.  The Court embraced a policy 
that “this basic deficiency should . . . be exposed at the point of minimum 
expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.”178  This follows 
the rule of construction promoting “just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination.”179  In support of this policy, Justice Souter cited the “unusually 
high cost of discovery,” which can account for “as much as 90 percent of 
litigation costs when discovery is actively employed.”180  Justice Souter also 
noted that once cases reach discovery, judges can do little to manage the 
costs.181 
Contrasted against Justice Stevens’s dissent, the majority’s test becomes a 
conscious choice to defer to defendants rather than to plaintiffs.  Justice 
Stevens began Part II of his dissent by reminding the reader that Conley 
reversed a decision dismissing a complaint by black railway workers alleging 
workplace discrimination during the Civil Rights Era.182  Only after 
substituting these sympathetic plaintiffs could he argue that a “no lawsuit left 
behind” policy would fit a case like Twombly.  Setting aside the Twombly 
majority’s assertion that the Conley complaint would survive a Twombly 
 
 176 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 177 Id. at 559. 
 178 Id. at 558 (alteration in original). 
 179 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 180 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558, 559. 
 181 Id. at 559–60 & n.6. 
 182 Id. at 576 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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motion to dismiss, Justice Stevens overlooked the possibility that a flexible 
deference principle could distinguish between a Conley and a Twombly.183  The 
language from his dissent quoting Adam Smith about tradesmen conspiring 
against the public evinced a cavalier attitude toward charges of commercial 
malfeasance.184  This perhaps explains his willingness to defer to plaintiffs 
rather than defendants in Twombly and similar cases. 
A political question also underlies Twombly’s controversy.  The Court 
mentions in passing that “Congress may have expected” some of the 
defendants to compete with the others but judges that “the disappointment does 
not make conspiracy plausible.”185  To put the point more directly, Congress 
attempted to introduce more competition to the telecommunications 
industry,186 but its efforts did not meet expectations.  Inasmuch as the plaintiffs 
attempted to bootstrap this failed policy into a conspiracy by res ipsa 
loquitur,187 they would have usurped from Congress the responsibility to 
amend a poorly conceived law.  This should give some pause to a Court with 
constitutional jurisdiction over cases and controversies rather than political 
questions, and the Court rightly avoids “expressing lack of the respect due 
coordinate branches of government”188 by leaving the matter for Congress to 
fix, should it choose to do so. 
In constructing a deference principle from Twombly, the two factors above 
should weigh in courts’ deference analysis for complaints with notice gaps.  
Judges should dismiss complaints describing inchoate disputes whose merits 
are so remote as to settle primarily on the basis of nuisance value.  In other 
words, discovery burdens become unfair when a careful inquiry into the 
complaint eliminates any conclusion other than that the plaintiffs are pursuing 
the case primarily for opportunistic reasons. 
2. Protection of Public Interests in Ashcroft v. Iqbal 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal served as Twombly’s public-interest counterpart by 
raising, in a suit against public officials, discovery burdens analogous to those 
 
 183 See infra Part III.B. 
 184 See supra notes 128–29 and accompanying text. 
 185 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 (majority opinion). 
 186 Id. at 544. 
 187 The Twombly plaintiffs were attempting an end run around Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law 
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004), in which the Court held that this congressional policy 
did not expand the scope of telecommunications companies’ antitrust liability. 
 188 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
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leveled against private parties in Twombly.  Unlike Twombly, Iqbal involved a 
genuine dispute antecedent to the filing of the action, in which the plaintiff 
accused federal law enforcement officers of egregious civil rights violations.189  
The question that reached the Iqbal Court on certiorari, however, did not 
involve these concrete allegations.  Instead, it took up an ancillary claim.  The 
Iqbal plaintiff had attempted to shoehorn top officials at the Department of 
Justice into the case, including the Attorney General of the United States, by 
way of an unsubstantiated conspiracy theory.190 
Iqbal demonstrates how the same policies that have generated special 
evidentiary standards, such as the “plus factors” in Twombly’s antitrust 
claim191 or the wrongful intent here needed to overcome qualified immunity,192 
require corresponding pleading standards.  As Justice Kennedy explains, “[t]he 
basic thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials from the 
concerns of litigation, including ‘avoidance of disruptive discovery.’”193  
Further, 
[i]f a Government official is to devote time to his or her duties, and to 
the formulation of sound and responsible policies, it is 
counterproductive to require the substantial diversion that is attendant 
to participating in litigation and making informed decisions as to how 
it should proceed.  Litigation, though necessary to ensure that 
officials comply with the law, exacts heavy costs in terms of 
efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and resources that might 
otherwise be directed to the proper execution of the work of the 
Government.  The costs of diversion are only magnified when 
Government officials are charged with responding to . . . a national 
and international security emergency unprecedented in the history of 
the American Republic.194 
The key to understanding the Court’s policy here comes from Justice 
Kennedy’s assertion that qualified immunity protects government officials not 
just from liability but from “litigation.”  Otherwise, discovery could have 
proceeded.  Assuming it would fail to turn up any evidence to prove the 
defendants’ wrongful intent, qualified immunity would mandate judgment for 
the defendants and vindicate their right to avoid liability. 
 
 189 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1943–44 (2009). 
 190 Id. at 1944. 
 191 See supra Part II.A.1. 
 192 See supra Part II.A.2. 
 193 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953. 
 194 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
MOLINE GALLEYSFINAL 10/22/2010  12:48 PM 
2010] NINETEENTH-CENTURY PRINCIPLES 191 
Failing to construe substantive-law evidentiary requirements as protections 
against litigation, not merely liability, and thereby failing to enforce them as 
pleading requirements, robs them of their value in promoting the public 
policies that underlie them.  Had this case proceeded through discovery, even a 
favorable summary judgment would have handed the defendants only a Pyrrhic 
victory.  By then, the damage Justice Kennedy described would have been 
done.  Especially in a suit for money damages, the difference between 
“discovery costs” and “liability” can become a matter of form rather than 
substance.  If a defendant were to settle a suit that he would have won on the 
merits because the litigation costs would exceed the settlement offer, he would 
suffer a monetary loss just as if the protection from liability did not exist.  The 
only difference would be the dollar amount.  Moreover, qualified immunity 
doctrine exists to promote the public interest in the “proper execution of the 
work of the Government,” benefitting public officials only incidentally.195  
Only by barring discovery to plaintiffs who cannot provide notice of how they 
would overcome qualified immunity at trial could courts “give real content to 
the concept of qualified immunity for high-level officials who must be neither 
deterred nor detracted from the vigorous performance of their duties.”196 
Iqbal’s subtext also presents a political question best handled through the 
political branches of government.  A looser pleading standard on state of mind 
for supervisory liability would allow any plaintiff with a claim against a 
government employee to yank a cabinet member or similarly high-ranking 
official into litigation, no matter how attenuated the connection, by alleging 
that the claim arose from a deliberate, wrongful policy crafted by that high 
official.  The need to generate a return on investment at least places some 
limits on entrepreneurial strike suits like Twombly.  Anyone long on money 
and short on scruples could finance frivolous litigation to punish officials for 
making unpopular policy decisions, even to the point of driving them out of 
office.197 
Iqbal points to two factors that should play a role in deference analysis.  
When cases directly affect the public interest through discovery that would 
burden public officials or public resources, courts should not indulge plaintiffs 
who cannot tell a complete story to define the dispute.  This serves as 
 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. at 1954. 
 197 Cf. Kevin Bohn, Ethics Complaints Follow Palin, CNN (July 24, 2009, 11:23 PM), http://www.cnn. 
com/2009/POLITICS/07/24/palin.ethics/index.html (relating a former Alaska governor’s claim that an 
avalanche of frivolous ethics complaints caused her to retire before finishing her term). 
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something of a corollary to the political question factor,198 which was also in 
play in Iqbal.  A complaint is no substitute for a ballot.  Courts subvert the 
integrity of the democratic process when they grant the losers a second vote 
through litigation.  Additionally, the presence of a political dimension common 
to each of these cases suggests that the deference principle may counsel strict 
dismissal only in a narrow band of cases.  This would minimize Twombly-
Iqbal’s disruption of the status quo ante. 
III.  TWO PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING JURISPRUDENCE 
As this Comment has demonstrated,199 the Twombly-Iqbal pleading 
jurisprudence consists of two major concepts: probing the complaint for gaps 
in the notice it provides and determining whether the court should defer to the 
defendant on the basis of unfair burdens that discovery would impose.  This 
Part extrapolates these two concepts, from the history of pleading as filtered 
through Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,200 into a notice-
gap principle and a deference principle.  The notice-gap principle judges a 
complaint’s notice deficient when the facts as stated, along with any 
reasonable inferences those facts would support, do not comprise a complete 
story of how the defendant came to be liable to the plaintiff.  The deference 
principle counsels the court to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim 
only when, as a result of the complaint’s deficiencies, the court could not fairly 
ask the defendant to assume the burdens of litigation. 
This Comment organizes these two principles into a two-step process.  
First, the judge determines whether the complaint provides the defendant 
sufficient notice.  Different kinds of legal disputes can revolve around 
wrongdoing ranging from a single instance of harm to misconduct on a grand 
scale.  The kinds of facts that make up a well-pleaded complaint will likewise 
vary from claim to claim.201  The judge uses “judicial experience and common 
sense”202 in weighing the inferences from the plaintiff’s allegations against 
countervailing inferences.  This allows him to figure whether the complaint 
describes a genuine antecedent dispute or merely seeks to create a dispute 
through discovery.  Second, if the judge determines that the complaint has a 
gap in the notice that it provides, he then ascertains whether the notice gap 
 
 198 See supra Part II.B.1. 
 199 See supra Part II. 
 200 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 201 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 38. 
 202 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. 
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would impose any unfair burden on the defendant were the case to proceed to 
discovery.  The plaintiff might seek to exploit the expense of discovery in 
extorting an “in terrorem increment of the settlement value,”203 to gain access 
to the defendant’s valuable secrets without any good-faith intent to use them in 
the present case, or simply to harass the defendant.  When the judge senses any 
of these injustices, he should defer to the defendant’s right to privacy and 
dismiss the complaint.  This deference principle operates as an equitable rule 
of reason, keeping meritorious cases in court and frivolous cases out. 
A. The Notice-Gap Principle 
This section describes the purpose and the methodology of implementing 
the notice-gap principle.  The notice-gap principle provides that, by examining 
the story of the plaintiff’s case for any gaps in the notice it provides, the judge 
can determine whether the plaintiff seeks to move an already existing, good-
faith dispute into the court or whether he hopes to use the court’s powers 
compelling discovery to develop an inchoate dispute into a cognizable claim.  
To accomplish this, the judge construes the pleadings liberally, making 
inferences to connect the plaintiff’s facts to the legal conclusions that would 
constitute a claim.  These inferences might be supplied by the plaintiff as 
conclusory statements or, as in Dioguardi v. Durning,204 by the judge himself.  
Judges should use these inferences to flesh out the facts in the story of the case 
except when strong countervailing inferences provide compelling reasons to 
disbelieve it. 
1. The Genuine Antecedent Dispute Requirement 
The presence of an antecedent dispute distinguishes discovery in private 
civil actions from the kinds of investigatory powers that congressional 
committees, administrative agencies, and grand juries possess.  Rule 8 does not 
allow a plaintiff to bring suit on suspicion that he is entitled to relief; rather, he 
must show that he is entitled to relief, or else his case will not survive a motion 
to dismiss.205  Without the threshold requirement of a genuine antecedent 
dispute, private litigants could command the broad investigatory powers of a 
government body free from the political and institutional constraints that check 
public actors.  Equitable factors afford litigants a broad exception to this 
 
 203 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975). 
 204 See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. 
 205 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
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rule,206 but the court need not consider them if the complaint provides adequate 
notice in the first place. 
When Rule 8 asks for “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief,”207 it both articulates the plaintiff’s duty to 
provide notice (“showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”) and limits the 
duty to a “short and plain statement.”  These two parts of the Rule apparently 
conflict when fair notice seems to require a statement that is long and 
elaborate.  This represents a mistaken understanding of “short and plain” as an 
absolute rather than relative term.  A short and plain Hemingway novel208 
might measure hundreds of pages.  A paragraph that lasts even a single page is 
long.  “Short and plain” means that courts should not require complaints any 
longer or more elaborate than necessary to provide fair notice to the defendant.  
Courts need only determine how much notice is necessary. 
The increasing complexity of some civil claims has forced this issue.  The 
original theory of notice pleading envisioned a light burden at the pleading 
stage both for plaintiffs and defendants.  The former would be free to plead in 
plain language.  The latter would receive a concise, straightforward 
explanation of the charges against them.  As new and complex causes of action 
developed,209 this complexity had to fall on either plaintiffs or defendants.  If 
plaintiffs could plead complex causes of action in filings as simple and short as 
before, then those pleadings would not give defendants the full story of the 
claims against them that they had previously enjoyed.  If pleadings’ detail and 
length increased in proportion to the complexity of the newer causes of action, 
then plaintiffs would need to gather more information before they could craft 
pleadings that would bring their disputes into the courts’ jurisdiction.  The 
increased difficulties of providing notice, along with similar difficulties of 
making do without it, require reexamining from the bottom up how much 
notice the system can practically expect plaintiffs to give defendants. 
Complaints involving traditional causes of action rarely require a subtle 
understanding of notice.  Field modeled pleading to allow “any plain man, 
hearing the parties’ own statements [to] get a better understanding, in half an 
hour, of the points in dispute between them, than the most astute lawyer can 
 
 206 See infra Part III.B. 
 207 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 208 See, e.g., ERNEST HEMINGWAY, THE SUN ALSO RISES (1926) (a veteran, emasculated by a war wound, 
falls for a lovely alcoholic, but malaise and anatomy preclude consummation).  
 209 For instance, neither the antitrust claim in Twombly nor the civil rights claims in Conley and Iqbal 
resemble the simple disputes in the Forms.  See supra Part II. 
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get from our modern records.”210  As such, the plaintiff’s story contains notice 
gaps if and only if it lacks details that a reasonable person would expect the 
plaintiff to possess. 
Consider a scenario in which the defendant punches the plaintiff, leading 
the plaintiff to sue him for battery.  Barring exceptional circumstances, 
plaintiffs in such cases always know the time, place, and manner of the battery.  
If the plaintiff were relating the incident to another person in an everyday 
conversation unrelated to any legal proceeding, his interlocutor would expect 
to hear these details.  Upon hearing them, she would, like any good American, 
tell the plaintiff, “You should sue.”  This is what it means to state a claim.  The 
plaintiff relates some facts.  These facts lead to the inference that the defendant 
is liable to the plaintiff. 
Now imagine the alternative version of this conversation, in which 
conclusions precede facts.  The plaintiff tells his interlocutor that the defendant 
has committed a battery against him.  She asks him what happened.  He 
replies, “I’m not sure, but I’m taking the defendant to court to find out.”  This 
would elicit a skeptical reaction from a reasonable person.  Although as a 
matter of fact the defendant may have committed a battery, the plaintiff has not 
here articulated his story as a cognizable legal dispute.  Moreover, the 
incongruous absence of pertinent information does not suggest to the 
interlocutor that the details are out there waiting to be found so much as that 
there are no details.  All complaints meriting dismissal fit this pattern.  The 
only difference between a simple tort like battery and an intricate one like 
conspiracy in restraint of trade is that the complexities of the latter case allow 
the plaintiff to conceal this basic truth within a Gordian Knot of conclusory 
allegations. 
The prior two examples serve to illustrate that legal conclusions need 
factual support because, in and of themselves, they provide no notice.  A legal 
conclusion at its most basic would consist merely of an allegation that the 
defendant is liable to the plaintiff.  A bare recital of the cause of action would 
situate the case in a particular area of law but still tell the defendant nothing 
about the circumstances that led to the accusation.  The Court recognized this 
in Twombly, explaining that a defendant wishing to prepare an answer to a set 
of factual allegations would know what to say, but a defendant trying to 
answer conclusory allegations would have “no clue.”211 
 
 210 FIELD, supra note 22, at 244; see also supra Part I.B. 
 211 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 n.10 (2007). 
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Instead of relying on the kind of abstruse distinctions that reigned under 
Code pleading, a court using the notice-gap model of analysis can differentiate 
a fact from a conclusion by asking whether the defendant has any way to 
answer the allegation.  Factual allegations frame the discovery process.  For 
each such allegation, the defendant must make an admission or denial, with the 
denials identifying the factual disputes to be resolved during discovery.  
Conclusory allegations do not aid the efficient administration of litigation.  The 
defendant cannot admit them without yielding the ultimate question of liability.  
When the defendant denies these conclusory allegations, discovery has no 
obvious way to proceed.  The plaintiff has neither committed himself to any 
particular manner of proving liability nor articulated “a reasonable expectation 
that discovery will reveal evidence” of the alleged wrongdoing.212 
This analysis connects the breach of duty—in providing insufficient 
notice—to the harm—discovery abuse.  The fewer facts the plaintiff needs to 
nail down before he acquires rights of discovery against the defendant, the 
more valuable to him—and the more burdensome on the defendant—those 
rights of discovery become.  It also shows how the defendant’s unclean hands 
(e.g., by destroying information that the defendant could have accessed even 
without discovery and that would have allowed the defendant to substantiate 
his story) might deny him Rule 12(b)(6) relief.213  Common law and Code 
pleading focused on ritual at the expense of substance.  Fair notice pleading 
should not delve into abstract questions of meaning except insofar as they 
relate back to the concrete problem of ensuring substantial fairness to litigants. 
The Court’s “plausibility” analysis also depends on notice.  The term 
“plausibility” is not merely unhelpful here but inaccurate.214  Cases that turn on 
issues of plausibility, although they too involve insufficient notice, implicate 
Rule 11, which requires the claimant to certify that “factual 
contentions . . . will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
opportunity for further investigation or discovery,” 215 rather than Rule 8.  Prior 
to Iqbal, in Tooley v. Napolitano (Tooley I), the D.C. Circuit incorrectly 
reversed a dismissal of a pro se plaintiff’s conspiracy theory on the grounds 
that his complaint met “the federal rules’ notoriously loose pleading 
criteria.”216  The plaintiff had claimed that after complaining to an airline that 
 
 212 Id. at 556. 
 213 See infra Part III.B.1. 
 214 See supra note 106. 
 215 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). 
 216 556 F.3d 836, 840 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
MOLINE GALLEYSFINAL 10/22/2010  12:48 PM 
2010] NINETEENTH-CENTURY PRINCIPLES 197 
lax security could allow a terrorist to put a bomb on a plane, the government 
began to monitor him through wiretaps, radio tags, and men in black.217  As 
Chief Judge Sentelle described in his dissent, the plaintiff 
would have us hold that he has adequately alleged unlawful 
wiretapping of an entire extended family, including at least nine 
separate phone lines based on no apparent source of belief other than 
“problematic phone connections, including telltale intermittent 
clicking noises.”  I note in passing that there is no reason to believe 
that wiretaps even cause problematic connections or intermittent 
clicking sounds.218 
In Twombly and Iqbal, the Court held that the complaints were implausible 
because they provided too little factual substantiation (i.e., notice).  Here, each 
of the complaint’s bizarre allegations pushed the plaintiff’s case further into 
the realm of the fantastical, as the D.C. Circuit noted in a post-Iqbal rehearing 
that overruled its prior disposition of the case.219 
A complaint can be, as in Twombly, implausible because it is incomplete 
or, as in Tooley, incomplete because it is implausible.  Whether the court 
focuses its inquiry on either plausibility or completeness of notice, it should, in 
principle, reach the same result.  However, an analysis that meets the notice 
gap directly rather than circumspectly avoids the unnecessary complications 
that come from treating complaints filed in bad faith as though they were 
nonsense.  The small sample of pleading cases that have recently come before 
the Supreme Court, including not just Twombly and Iqbal but also Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,220 all implicate incompleteness more than 
implausibility.  Despite the D.C. Circuit’s misapplication of Twombly in 
Tooley I, the true implausibility cases tend to be more straightforward and less 
consequential than the incompleteness cases.  Common sense alone can guide 
the court most, if not all, of the way to the proper resolution of the former.  For 
the more difficult and important cases, however, the notice-gap concept better 
assists courts in resolving them correctly and coherently. 
 
 217 Id. at 837. 
 218 Id. at 843–44 (Sentelle, C.J., dissenting). 
 219 Tooley v. Napolitano (Tooley II), 586 F.3d 1006, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 220 See Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (dismissing a private securities action for failure to allege 
loss causation adequately, when the complaint alleged only one, irrelevant economic loss and “nowhere else 
provide[d] the defendants with notice of what the relevant economic loss might be or of what the causal 
connection might be between that loss and the [underlying] misrepresentation”). 
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Although the Court did not choose to characterize its analysis this way, 
lower courts can use the notice-gap method consistently with Twombly and 
Iqbal because the same determinations that resolved the plausibility inquiry 
also would have disposed of those cases had the Court considered the matter as 
a notice problem.  In either case, but for the plaintiff’s conclusory allegations 
about the claim’s plus factors, the conduct described in the complaint’s factual 
statements would not have given rise to liability.  For the notice method, just as 
for the two-pronged analysis the Court suggests,221 the judge first determines 
which of the allegations are factual (or provide notice) and credit them as true.  
Then, instead of engaging in a fraught determination of whether the sum of all 
these allegations amounts to a “plausible” story, a judge using notice-gap 
analysis examines all of the necessary elements of the claim.  For each 
element, he asks whether the plaintiff’s factual allegations would satisfy that 
element.  If he detects any gaps, either because the plaintiff pleaded certain 
elements in conclusory statements or failed to mention anything relevant to 
those elements at all, then he should determine that the plaintiff has not, in the 
language of Rule 8, established his right to relief. 
2. The Strong Countervailing Inference Test 
The principal challenge in applying pleading requirements under Rule 8 
lies in the determination of which inferences to afford the plaintiff.  Between 
Conley and Twombly, the Court correctly overruled lower court decisions that, 
balking at Conley’s no set of facts standard, attempted to solve discovery-
abuse problems piecemeal by imposing particularity requirements on certain 
disfavored causes of action.222  Recall that Rule 9 codified a particularity 
requirement for allegations of fraud or mistake, which originated in the 
common law and also appeared in the Field Code.223  Although misread as an 
implied repudiation of fact pleading,224 Rule 9 supports a negative inference 
that all allegations other than fraud or mistake need not be “state[d] with 
particularity.”225 
 
 221 See supra text accompanying note 154. 
 222 See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (overruling heightened pleading standard 
for employment discrimination claims); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination 
Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993) (same for civil rights claims against municipalities); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail 
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (same for Title VII claims). 
 223 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 39 (describing common law and Code requirements for 
particularity when alleging certain causes of action). 
 224 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 225 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
MOLINE GALLEYSFINAL 10/22/2010  12:48 PM 
2010] NINETEENTH-CENTURY PRINCIPLES 199 
This Comment proposes a “strong countervailing inference” test to balance 
the need for reasonable specificity against the textual prohibition of a 
particularity requirement.  This Comment derives this test from Tellabs, Inc. v. 
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,226 a case decided shortly after Twombly.  Tellabs 
dealt with a cause of action that “requires plaintiffs to state with particularity 
both the facts constituting the alleged violation, and the facts evidencing 
scienter.”227  The Court held that this standard required judges to assemble the 
alleged facts into a story of the case.228  Judges would then compare the 
inference necessary to credit that story against other plausible inferences to 
determine that inference’s strength.229  A complaint would survive a motion to 
dismiss only if the inference were “at least as compelling as any opposing 
inference one could draw from the facts alleged.”230  If Tellabs represents a 
heightened pleading standard, then a liberal pleading standard would accept the 
plaintiff’s desired inference unless it were considerably less compelling than 
an opposing inference. 
The judge, then, should allow an inference for the plaintiff unless the facts 
give rise to a strong countervailing inference.  In a suit about a car accident, the 
allegation that at a particular date and place “the defendant negligently drove a 
motor vehicle against the plaintiff”231 sufficiently states a claim for 
negligence.232  This allegation would probably contain a notice gap under the 
Tellabs standard.  These facts are also consistent with the inference that the 
plaintiff’s negligence, rather than the defendant’s, caused the accident.  The 
judge would probably need to take judicial notice of negligence statistics in car 
accidents to cross that notice gap.  The plaintiff could secure his day in court 
only by alleging additional facts, e.g., that the plaintiff was walking through a 
designated crosswalk while the walk sign was lit and the traffic light 
controlling the defendant was red.  Such a pleading requirement would be 
inappropriate for most cases, adding superfluous details to complaints and then 
spurring Code-style litigation over whether complaints adequately plead to a 
formalistic level of specificity. 
 
 226 551 U.S. 308 (2007). 
 227 Id. at 313. 
 228 Cf. id. at 322 (“The inquiry . . . is whether all of the facts alleged, taken collectively, give rise to a 
strong inference . . . .”). 
 229 Id. at 323–24. 
 230 Id. at 324. 
 231 FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11 (2007). 
 232 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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The “strong countervailing inference” test presents no such difficulties 
because these facts do not support a strong countervailing inference that the 
defendant was not negligent.  These facts are consistent with either party’s 
negligence.  No fact gives any particular reason to discredit the plaintiff’s 
inference.  Moreover, these facts, taken as true, necessarily would give rise to a 
genuine antecedent dispute.  In a situation like this, the plaintiff could fail to 
state a claim only by pleading himself out of court with additional allegations 
claiming, for example, that the plaintiff had jumped in front of the defendant’s 
car immediately before the defendant struck him. 
Note that, under Conley’s no set of facts standard, this last allegation would 
not keep the plaintiff out of court.  Even though this version of the complaint 
gives no reason to believe that the defendant’s negligence caused the accident 
and strong reason to believe that the plaintiff’s negligence did, it does not 
appear beyond doubt that the defendant’s negligence could not also have 
contributed enough to the accident to incur liability.  This would not qualify as 
a genuine antecedent dispute.  The plaintiff has essentially alleged himself the 
wrongdoer in the incident by stating the defendant’s potential claim against 
him.  It would not become a real “dispute” unless and until the “defendant” 
were to make it one by seeking damages against the “plaintiff.”  The “strong 
countervailing inference” test strikes a balance between Tellabs’s particularity 
standard, which would be inappropriately stringent for most types of claims, 
and Conley’s no set of facts standard, which would be inappropriately lax. 
B. The Deference Principle 
Although the foregoing test would suffice to resolve cases under the 
Twombly-Iqbal doctrine, this Comment proposes an additional equitable 
principle of deference to defendants who would bear unfair burdens from 
discovery.  This principle answers the question of what a court should do when 
a complaint has a harmless or minimally harmful notice gap, on the basis of the 
Court’s stated rationale for the Twombly-Iqbal rule.  In both Twombly and 
Iqbal, the Court considered prospective discovery that would have unfairly 
burdened the defendants, given the plaintiffs’ inability to bridge the notice gap 
by substantiating their allegations.233  The Court did not have occasion to 
consider whether a court should dismiss a complaint for insufficient notice 
even when the prospective discovery would be minimally burdensome. 
 
 233 See supra Part II.A. 
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This Comment’s proposed principle of deference states that courts should 
only dismiss complaints for failure to state a claim if the complaint has a notice 
gap and if proceeding to discovery would impose an unfair burden on the 
defendant.  This principle comes not from any part of the holding in Twombly 
or Iqbal but from the dicta in each case about how discovery would harm each 
defendant.234  When discovery promises that kind of harm, the judge should 
dismiss the claim until the plaintiff can substantiate his claim well enough to 
justify the intrusion into the defendant’s affairs. 
This equitable principle calls on judges to apply their judicial experience 
and common sense to keep meritorious cases in court and frivolous cases out.  
A judge should not dismiss a case strictly on technical grounds.  If the 
defendant’s wrongdoing causes the notice gap, then the court should not 
dismiss the complaint.  The defendant should not profit from his wrongdoing.  
He also vitiates the purpose of notice when he demonstrates such 
consciousness of guilt.  Some areas of law, such as bankruptcy, have inherent 
disincentives to curb discovery abuse, and there too dismissal for all but the 
most egregious notice gaps would be improper.  As for keeping frivolous cases 
out, the deference principle will mandate dismissal mainly in one particular 
class of case, the “private prosecution.”  This Comment defines the term to 
describe a type of case in which an enterprising plaintiff brings suit either in 
bad faith or on mere suspicion of wrongdoing, seeking to use liberal discovery 
as a sort of ersatz grand jury.  Just as judges in criminal cases are mindful of 
the burdens that those proceedings place upon the accused, they should show 
similar deference to civil defendants in cases that take on some of the character 
of criminal prosecutions. 
1. Keeping Meritorious Cases In 
The deference principle should excuse notice-gap problems when the 
notice gap comes from the defendant’s wrongdoing itself or when the notice 
gap would cause little harm to the defendant.  For an example of the former, 
consider Wilson v. City of Chicago, in which the court denied a motion to 
dismiss when the plaintiff in a conspiracy case did not know the particular 
wrongdoers among a group of defendants but could otherwise plead the full 
 
 234 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (explaining that forcing officials to devote their 
time to discovery rather than government would run against the public interest); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546 (2007) (worrying about undertaking expensive discovery without adequate 
justification). 
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story of the alleged conspiracy.235  According to the complaint, the police-
officer defendants coerced two witnesses into testifying against the plaintiff in 
a murder trial, but the plaintiff did not know which officer did what.236  The 
court correctly rejected the defendants’ argument that the plaintiff could not 
force each defendant individually to respond to the allegations in the 
complaint, noting that the complaint otherwise provided enough factual detail 
for each officer to admit or deny the allegations.237 
The notice gap in this case came from the nature of the alleged tort itself, 
and denying discovery for a minor defect here would have unfairly prejudiced 
the plaintiff’s ability to vindicate his substantive rights.  Unlike Twombly, in 
which the plaintiff could adequately allege neither the wrong nor the 
wrongdoer, here the plaintiff succeeded in alleging the harm.  Because 
conspiracy inherently involves concealing information, i.e., the roles of the 
conspirators, crediting the complaint’s allegation of conspiracy implies 
excusing that information’s absence from the complaint.  The Wilson court 
illustrated this problem with the following scenario: 
Two police officers arrest a person, and after handcuffing him and 
placing him on the ground, one officer kicks the arrestee in the head.  
It would be patently unfair and illogical to force such a person to 
identify which of the two officers committed the act before taking 
discovery.  Carried to the extreme, Defendants’ position would 
prevent any plaintiff from engaging in any court-assisted discovery 
without knowing the exact perpetrator of a tort against him.238 
In this situation, the erroneously accused group-member defendant finds 
himself on the same footing as any other factually innocent defendant.  A 
plaintiff might have a good-faith but mistaken belief that a defendant injured 
him, and a well-pleaded complaint laying out these allegations would allow the 
plaintiff discovery.  It is a feature of the American legal system as a whole, 
rather than pleading doctrine specifically, that defendants bear some of the 
costs of these good-faith errors. 
Even for cases in which the plaintiff caused the notice gap, the deference 
principle does not mandate dismissal when the defendant would suffer minimal 
 
 235 No. 09-C-2477, 2009 WL 3242300 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2009). 
 236 Id. at *1. 
 237 Id. at *2.  The Wilson court cited Seventh Circuit precedent reaffirming, after Iqbal, the sensible rule 
not to dismiss a claim whose only defect is that the defendant cannot identify an “unknown member of a 
collective body.”  Id. (quoting Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009)). 
 238 Id. 
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harm from litigating the case.  The prime example of this situation comes from 
bankruptcy law.  Several features of bankruptcy proceedings protect litigants 
from the same problems that prompted Twombly-Iqbal, making the latter 
mostly redundant.  Bankruptcy cases can only last for as long as the debtor has 
assets left to distribute to its creditors.  The creditors have an incentive not to 
waste the bankruptcy estate’s time and money on frivolous litigation.  Any 
resources that go toward litigation become unavailable for creditors to collect, 
and again, this is especially true of the zero-sum liquidation game.  The 
trustee’s or debtor in possession’s fiduciary duty toward the bankruptcy estate 
prevents it from initiating litigation without any reasonable prospects of 
enhancing and maintaining the estate’s value.  A court should dismiss for 
failure to state a claim only when exceptional circumstances give the court 
good reason to believe that a particular case will bypass those safeguards. 
The alternative to reading the deference principle into the Court’s dicta 
would be to rigidly apply the Twombly-Iqbal standard even in cases that could 
not possibly lead to the kind of unfairness that prompted the Court’s action in 
those two cases.  Angell v. BER Care, Inc. (In re Caremerica, Inc.),239 in which 
the court relied on Twombly and Iqbal to dismiss an adversary complaint for 
failure to state a claim, shows why the notice analysis is inappropriate for 
bankruptcy cases.  The Angell court reasoned that because Iqbal showed that 
the Twombly rule applied beyond antitrust law,240 it should apply equally to 
bankruptcy practice.241  In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected pre-
Twombly authority on pleading standards, even though that authority rested on 
the same language from Conley that the Twombly Court had quoted 
approvingly.242  The Angell court ignored the policy rationale of Twombly and 
Iqbal, dismissing out of hand the complainant’s argument that the court should 
not strictly apply the Twombly-Iqbal standard because it would not further 
those cases’ policy goals.243  This decision recalls the Code pleading era, 
ritualistically applying a pleading standard to accomplish nothing more than 
prevent a potentially meritorious claim from moving forward. 
 
 239 409 B.R. 737, 746 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2009). 
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. at 748–50. 
 242 Compare id. at 748–49 (citing Brandywine Apartments v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of 
The IT Group (In re The IT Group, Inc.), 313 B.R. 370, 374 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004) (noting that the complaint 
should provide “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests”)), with Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) 
(same)). 
 243 Angell, 409 B.R. at 754. 
MOLINE GALLEYSFINAL 10/22/2010  12:48 PM 
204 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60 
Courts should not follow the Angell decision and instead ought to consider 
how to apply Twombly-Iqbal with the Court’s policy goals in mind.  Although 
bankruptcy perhaps provides the purest example of litigation in equilibrium, 
courts should look to similar features of other types of cases to determine 
whether they can relax Twombly-Iqbal’s pleading standards without subjecting 
the defendant to undue harm.  The presence of structural safeguards that 
already protect defendants vitiates the risk of unfair burdens that led to the 
Court’s Twombly-Iqbal jurisprudence. 
2. Keeping Frivolous Cases Out 
Having shown how the deference principle affords judges the flexibility to 
implement Twombly-Iqbal as liberally as a fair reading of those cases allows, 
this Comment turns to the question of when courts should apply Twombly-
Iqbal strictly.  This Comment understands Twombly-Iqbal as a narrow solution 
to a particular problem that Judge Clark had not anticipated in adapting the 
Rules from David Dudley Field’s prototype.  This narrow reading minimally 
upsets established practice and avoids any unintended consequences that might 
come from a needlessly labored interpretation of the Rules’ austere language, 
which for the most part has endured the several decades since its enactment 
without requiring any judicial renovations. 
This Comment characterizes this problem as the phenomenon of the 
“private prosecution.”  The practice of suing based on suspicion of 
wrongdoing, without a further basis of information and belief, defines the 
private prosecution.  Private prosecutions tend to attack diffuse rather than 
individualized wrongdoing.  They accomplish this either directly through the 
class-action process or indirectly against actors perceived to commit 
widespread harms beyond the subject matter of the particular case.  Traditional 
common law litigation—a plaintiff suing in tort who seeks to be made whole 
through a sum that represents the harm inflicted—rights wrongs by reversing 
the wrongdoer–victim relationship into the plaintiff–defendant relationship. 
Private prosecutions target defendants with concentrated economic or 
political power to achieve the best “return” on the litigation resources plaintiffs 
“invest.”  This litigation lasts until the costs of pursuing it begin to eat into the 
marginal returns.  This makes liberal discovery lucrative because it places 
burdens on defendants out of proportion to the effort plaintiffs exert to secure a 
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return.244  A private prosecution need not reach the merits to serve this 
purpose.245  The diffuse interests involved, along with both plaintiffs and 
defendants being repeat players in litigation, add a public dimension to private 
prosecutions.246  The contours of the liability these suits impose can guide 
defendants’ subsequent behavior, acting as de facto regulation.247 
Both Twombly and Iqbal involved private prosecutions.  Although private 
plaintiffs brought those cases, the Department of Justice could have chosen to 
investigate the underlying allegations of misconduct.248  Unlike private 
citizens, these agencies have broad investigatory powers and need not rely on 
civil discovery to build their cases.249  In principle, these agencies can (and 
arguably do) use those powers to harass and to burden parties like the 
defendants in Twombly or Iqbal, but policy and political considerations can 
discourage them from undertaking prosecutions manifestly not in the public 
interest. 
No such constraints limit opportunistic civil plaintiffs.  Once an opportunist 
gains access to the discovery process, liberal discovery obligates the target to 
yield his privacy in much the same way as the target of a federal investigation.  
In either case, failure to comply with discovery proceedings would put the 
defendant in contempt of court.  Without some kind of bulwark at the pleading 
stage, anyone with the resources to finance a legal team could become a 
private attorney general and pursue targets of opportunity for monetary or 
political gain. 
The deference principle curtails this kind of abuse by restricting would-be 
private prosecutors to a limited institutional role.  A plaintiff with enough 
access to non-public information about a target defendant to provide adequate 
notice could find himself in a better position to file suit and conduct an 
investigation through discovery than the appropriate government agency.  A 
government agency might also uncover information that could form a basis for 
private liability but elect not to sue, in which case a private prosecutor might 
 
 244 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (“[T]he threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to 
settle even anemic cases before reaching those proceedings.”). 
 245 “[T]he principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits” comes 
from no less an authority than Conley v. Gibson itself.  355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957). 
 246 See supra Part II.B. 
 247 See supra Part II.B. 
 248 See 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2006) (granting United States attorneys power to prosecute antitrust violations); 18 
U.S.C. § 242 (2006) (defining deprivation of civil rights under color of law as a felony). 
 249 See 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (2006) (enumerating administrative agencies’ investigatory powers). 
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use the Freedom of Information Act250 to learn enough to litigate the matter 
himself. 
Private prosecutions call for the most exacting application of the Twombly-
Iqbal standard.  Courts should always remember that private prosecutions yield 
broad enforcement and regulatory powers to citizens acting on behalf of 
personal or special interests.  The statutes giving individuals powers concurrent 
to those of the government contain protective elements to prevent their abuse, 
but as in Iqbal and Twombly,251 plaintiffs may try to exploit low pleading 
standards when access to discovery is valuable enough in itself to encourage 
frivolous lawsuits.  Defending the pretrial litigation process from attempts by 
plaintiffs to co-opt it promotes the long-term viability of its other liberal 
features, such as broad discovery. 
As a matter of probability, Twombly-Iqbal dismissal will in some cases 
prevent discovery that would have revealed wrongdoing, even though the 
complaint could not articulate any reason to expect it.  Nonetheless, such cases 
are not “meritorious” in any meaningful sense, because for the purposes of 
pleading “merit” means merit at the outset rather than at judgment.  The 
meritorious cases distinguish themselves from the frivolous on the basis of 
their prospective worth in competing for the judiciary’s limited resources.  The 
fact that a stopped clock is right twice a day should not stop us from fixing it.  
Characterizing litigation in this manner—strictly on the basis of its final 
outcome—would also mean classifying the losing side’s case as retrospectively 
frivolous.  It would ignore the purpose of the civil justice system: to resolve 
disputes civilly regardless of outcome.  The Rules accomplish this when a 
plaintiff earns his day in court by stating a claim that would entitle him to 
relief. 
Moreover, a fair reading of the Federal Rules precludes the practice of 
pleading on suspicion rather than genuine information or belief.  Recall Rule 
11’s requirement that the pleader before the court must certify that “the factual 
contentions have evidentiary support or . . . will likely have evidentiary support 
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.”252  
Contentions in complaints with notice gaps ipso facto lack “evidentiary 
support.”  A litigant certifying the complaint must then have some objective 
reason to believe that they “will likely have evidentiary support.”  If so, the 
 
 250 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
 251 See supra Part II. 
 252 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). 
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plaintiff can put that reason into the complaint to bridge the notice gap.  
Otherwise, he would defraud the court by certifying the allegations.  Even 
under the assumption that private prosecutions of unsubstantiated claims serve 
some public interest to justify relaxing Rule 8, a plaintiff cannot bring such a 
claim without making a false certification to the court.  This characteristic of 
private prosecutions further distinguishes them from most other civil actions 
under the Rules.  Perhaps a new Rule built around the conscious goal of 
maximizing their systemic benefits and minimizing their systemic costs would 
better handle this sort of litigation than a method that attempts to work private 
prosecution into a Rule designed with a different class of cases in mind.  
Consider that the failure of Twombly-Iqbal to curb discovery abuse would 
necessitate further reforms, whose collateral effects on meritorious claims 
could prove far costlier. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment represents a project of reconciliations.  Twombly and Iqbal 
seem to their critics an abrupt step back to a less rational past.  A more 
thorough study of the history, though, shows that the reformers on the Supreme 
Court sought the same goals as the drafters of the Federal Rules.  They in turn 
were continuing the project begun in the nineteenth century by David Dudley 
Field, the great legal reformer of his era.  Though the particularities of its 
implementation have changed in the intervening decades, the ethic that Field 
laid down has persevered.  This Comment merely adapts that ethic into 
principles that address the problems of contemporary pleading. 
The concept of the notice gap focuses courts on the complaint’s role, as 
understood prior to Conley.  The plaintiff must tell the defendant and the court 
the story of his case.  This requires enough factual detail so that all involved 
can understand who committed the wrong and what, where, when, and how it 
occurred.  Any complaint that tells this story, without any gaps, provides fair 
notice to the defendant and allows the plaintiff to proceed to discovery.  Courts 
should consider dismissing a complaint only when it fails to provide notice and 
would subject the defendant to the kind of abusive discovery that the Twombly 
and Iqbal defendants faced. 
Adding the deference principle as an equitable rule of reason to the bare 
notice analysis reclaims some of the benefits of the overbroad Conley doctrine.  
This Comment understands Twombly as mandating a change in priorities, not 
necessarily an abandonment of the concerns that animated the Conley Court.  
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Once a judge ensures in a particular case that the abuses that Twombly-Iqbal 
sought to prevent are absent, he should then apply the permissive version of 
the Conley standard to the extent compatible with Twombly-Iqbal and 
consistent with procedural fairness.  Using these two doctrines in concert 
directs the court toward the exercise of its gate-keeping powers for the benefit 
of either party, as justice requires. 
Developing a pleading rule means, ultimately, reconciling the wronged 
plaintiff’s desire for the courts to redress his injury against the innocent 
defendant’s desire for the courts to let him alone.  As the continuous invention 
of new rights insinuates the courts into more and more formerly private 
disputes, consider whether we should not welcome a small step in the opposite 
direction. 
This Comment stands on the shoulders of civil procedure’s giants: David 
Dudley Field in the nineteenth century and Judge Clark in the twentieth.  They 
foresaw most of the same problems with pleading that the profession now 
faces today.  This Comment only begins the process of updating the full scope 
of their ideas into today’s pleading doctrine. 
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